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Article 
Two Constitutional Rights, Two Constitutional 
Controversies 
MICHAEL J. PERRY 
This Article is my contribution to the Festschrift celebrating the distinguished 
scholarly career of Richard S. Kay, Wallace Stevens Professor Emeritus, and 
Oliver Ellsworth Research Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. 
My overarching aim in the Article is to defend a particular understanding of 
two constitutional rights and, relatedly, a particular resolution of two 
constitutional controversies. The two rights I discuss are among the most 
important rights protected by the constitutional law of the United States: the right 
to equal protection and the right of privacy. As I explain in the Article, the 
constitutional right to equal protection is, at its core, the human right to moral 
equality, and the constitutional right to privacy is best understood as a version of 
the human right to moral freedom. The two controversies I discuss, each of which 
implicates the two rights, are among the most divisive constitutional controversies 
of our time: the controversies concerning, respectively, abortion and same-sex 
marriage. 
Arguments of the two sorts I make in this Article—arguments defending a 
particular understanding of one or more constitutional rights and arguments 
defending a particular resolution of one or more constitutional controversies—
necessarily presuppose a theory of judicial review. The theory of judicial review 
on which I rely, and whose basic features I rehearse in the Article, is the theory I 
defend at length in my most recent book, A Global Political Morality: Human 
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Two Constitutional Rights, Two Constitutional 
Controversies 
MICHAEL J. PERRY * 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I excerpt, reconfigure, revise, and expand on portions of 
my most recent book, A Global Political Morality: Human Rights, 
Democracy, and Constitutionalism.1 I do so in order to present in a single 
article my reflections on two constitutional rights and two constitutional 
controversies. The two rights I discuss are among the most important rights 
protected by the constitutional law of the United States: the right to equal 
protection and the right of privacy. And the two controversies are among 
the most divisive constitutional controversies of our time: the controversies 
concerning, respectively, abortion and same-sex marriage. My overarching 
aim here is to defend a particular understanding of each of the two rights 
and, relatedly, a particular resolution of each of the two controversies. 
                                                                                                                     
* Robert W. Woodruff University Chair and Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and 
Religion, Emory University. Professor Perry was the inaugural occupant both of the Howard J. 
Trienens Chair in Law, Northwestern University, 1990-97, and of the University Distinguished Chair in 
Law, Wake Forest University, 1997-2003.  
I am both honored and delighted to have been invited to contribute to the Festschrift celebrating 
Rick Kay’s scholarly career. I have long and greatly admired Rick’s constitutional scholarship. I don’t 
remember exactly when I first encountered Rick’s work, but it was no later than 1980, when I was a 
member of the Ohio State law faculty and invited Rick to contribute to a symposium that the Ohio State 
Law Journal would publish the following year. The symposium, titled Judicial Review versus 
Democracy, was occasioned by the publication in 1980 both of John Ely’s Democracy and Distrust: A 
Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard Univ. Press 1980) and of Jesse Choper’s Judicial Review and the 
National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Univ. of 
Chi. Press 1980). See Richard S. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981). Several 
years later, after I’d become a member of the Northwestern law faculty, Rick shared with me the draft 
of a paper so discerning and wise that I immediately encouraged the student editors of the 
Northwestern University Law Review to publish the paper, which they did. See Richard S. Kay, 
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 
82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). About twenty years later, Rick published a related and no less superb 
paper in the same venue: Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009). The three writings I’ve just cited are just a small part of 
Rick Kay’s scholarly corpus—a truly impressive scholarly corpus. 
I am grateful to my colleague Deborah Dinner for very helpful comments on a draft of this 
Article. 
1 MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2017) [hereinafter, PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY].  
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I. A PRELIMINARY MATTER: JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Arguments of the two sorts I make in this Article—arguments 
defending a particular understanding of one or more constitutional rights 
and arguments defending a particular resolution of one or more 
constitutional controversies—necessarily presuppose a theory of judicial 
review. The theory of judicial review on which I rely here is the theory I 
defend at length in A Global Political Morality.2 It suffices, for purposes of 
this Article, to rehearse the basic features of the theory. 
The General Rule. When deciding whether a challenged law or other 
government action violates a particular constitutional norm, the Supreme 
Court of the United States (SCOTUS) generally should rule in the negative 
if the judgment is at least reasonable either that the norm is not a 
constitutional norm or that the government action does not violate the 
norm.3 
What are the conditions whose satisfaction warrants the conclusion 
that a particular right or other norm claimed to be a constitutional norm—
claimed, that is, to be protected by the constitutional law of the United 
States—truly is a constitutional norm? Let N stand for a particular norm. N 
is a constitutional norm if any of the three following conditions are 
satisfied: 
First. N is a constitutional norm if constitutional enactors made N a 
constitutional norm—if they entrenched N in the Constitution of the United 
States; if other, later enactors did not entrench in the Constitution a norm 
that supersedes N; and if no norm that supersedes N has become 
constitutional bedrock. (I explain what I mean by “constitutional bedrock” 
below.) By constitutional “enactors,” I mean what Richard Kay means: 
By enactors, I mean the human beings whose approval gave 
the Constitution the force of law. In the case of the original 
establishment of the United States Constitution that means 
the people comprising the majorities in the nine state 
conventions whose ratification preceded the Constitution 
entering into force. With respect to the amendments that 
means the people comprising the majorities in the houses of 
                                                                                                                     
2 See id. at 95–118 (arguing that judicial review is the enforcement of constitutional norms and 
rights). 
3 The General Rule is Thayerian, and I use the term “reasonable” in the sense in which James 
Bradley Thayer used it. On the Thayerian approach to judicial review, see id. at 103–07. For a recent, 
succinct statement of Thayer’s position on judicial review, see Vicki C. Jackson, Thayer, Holmes, 
Brandeis: Conceptions of Judicial Review, Factfinding, and Proportionality, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2348, 
2349–50 (2017). 
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Congress proposing the amendments and in the ratifying 
legislatures of the necessary three-quarters of the states.4 
Second. N is a constitutional norm if N is an inescapable inference (a) 
from the structure of government established by the Constitution, which 
consists of (i) a separation of powers among the three branches—
legislative, executive, and judicial—of the national government and (ii) a 
division of powers between the national government and state government 
(“federalism”),5 or (b) from the kind of government (“representative 
democracy”) presupposed by the Constitution;6 and if no norm that 
supersedes N has been entrenched in the Constitution or become 
constitutional bedrock.   
Third. N is a constitutional norm if N is constitutional bedrock—if N is 
a bedrock feature of the constitutional law of the United States—in this 
sense: N has become, in the words of Robert Bork, “so embedded in the 
life of the nation, so accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private 
and public expectations of individuals and institutions,” that SCOTUS 
should and almost certainly will continue to deem N constitutionally 
authoritative even if it is open to serious question whether enactors ever 
entrenched N in the Constitution.7 As Michael McConnell has put the 
point: “[M]any decisions, even some that were questionable or 
controversial when rendered, have become part of the fabric of American 
                                                                                                                     
4 Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 703, 709 n.28 (2009). 
5 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47 
(1969) (basing the Supreme Court’s role in due process in federalism). See also Thomas B. Colby, 
Originalism and Structural Argument, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (2019) (stating that Supreme 
Court opinions “rest . . . on freestanding principles of federalism”); Michael Ramsey, Thomas Colby: 
Originalism and Structural Argument, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2019/04/thomas-colby-originalism-and-
structural-argumentmichael-rmasey.html (commenting on Colby’s position that originalists rest on 
freestanding principles of federalism in lieu of the original meaning of the Constitution). 
6 In his well-known and oft-cited 1971 lecture, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems,” Robert Bork, then Professor of Law at Yale, observed that historical inquiry into the 
original understanding of those parts of the First Amendment that concern speech had yielded little if 
any useful information: “The framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear 
not to have been overly concerned with the subject. . . . The first amendment, like the rest of the Bill of 
Rights, appears to have been a hastily drafted document upon which little thought was expended.” 
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971). 
Bork hastened to add that this state of affairs was problematic because, Bork reasoned, “the entire 
structure of the Constitution creates a representative democracy, a form of government that would be 
meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its policies.” Id. at 23. Such freedom “could 
and should be inferred even if there were no first amendment.” Id. According to Bork, then, whatever 
the “hastily drafted” First Amendment happens to say about speech, a constitutional right to freedom of 
speech is appropriately inferable from the kind of government—“representative democracy”—
established by the Constitution of the United States. 
7 ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158 
(1989). 
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life; it is inconceivable that they would now be overruled. . . . This 
overwhelming public acceptance constitutes a mode of popular ratification 
. . . .”8 
The foregoing threefold position regarding the conditions whose 
satisfaction warrants the claim that a norm truly is a constitutional norm 
seems to me to be the least contentious on offer.9 And given both that 
position and the General Rule, it follows that when deciding whether a 
norm claimed to have constitutional status has such status, SCOTUS 
generally should rule in the negative if the judgment is at least reasonable 
that none of the three conditions specified above is satisfied; SCOTUS 
should do so, that is, even if the judgment is reasonable that one (or more) 
of the three conditions is satisfied. 
The Exception to the General Rule. There is, however, an important 
exception to the General Rule: If in a case before SCOTUS a right that is 
part of the morality of human rights10 is claimed to have constitutional 
status, SCOTUS should rule that the right has such status if the judgment is 
                                                                                                                     
8 Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and 
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2417 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)). For a more recent, nuanced statement of Professor 
McConnell’s position that “stare decisis, at least in its moderate form, is essential to any system of fair 
adjudication, including constitutional law,” see Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and 
Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745, 1765 (2015). See also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 239 (2012) (discussing 
how judicial precedent is ingrained in society); JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, 
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 175–76, 179, 181 (2013) (discussing the crucial role of 
judicial precedent). 
For an argument that “[i]t is not necessarily unoriginalist to adhere to an unoriginalist precedent,” 
see William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2358–61 (2015). See also 
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra, at 172–73 (explaining the interaction between precedent and 
originalism); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 817, 861–64 (2015) (discussing stare decisis and its role in originalism theories). 
It is not inconsistent to affirm an originalist response to the question of what it means, or should 
mean, to interpret the constitutional text while also affirming that the constitutional text is not the sole 
legitimate basis of constitutional adjudication. For support of this position, see Gary Lawson, 
Originalism Without Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1309–10 (2013); Gary Lawson, No History, No 
Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 1551, 1551 (2012). 
9 Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 138–39 
(Amy Guttman ed., 2d ed. 2018): 
Originalism, like any other theory of interpretation put into practice in an ongoing 
system of law, must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot remake the 
world anew. It is of no more consequence at this point whether the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798 were in accord with the original understanding of the First 
Amendment than it is whether Marbury v. Madison was decided correctly. . . . 
[O]riginalism will make a difference . . . not in the rolling back of accepted old 
principles of constitutional law but in the rejection of usurpatious new ones. 
10 On “the morality of human rights,” see, for example, PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, 
supra note 1, at 20–21. 
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at least reasonable that at least one of the three conditions specified above 
is satisfied. 
The fundamental rationale for the General Rule is that by exercising 
the power of judicial review according to the General Rule, SCOTUS 
would bring the constitutional law of the United States into closer 
alignment with the morality of human rights; SCOTUS would reduce—not 
eliminate, but reduce—the extent to which the constitutional law of the 
United States is morally problematic, as evaluated from the perspective of 
the morality of human rights—from the perspective, in particular, of the 
human right to democratic governance—a core aspect of which (as I 
explain in A Global Political Morality) is the presumptive right of a 
majority to prevail.11 But, the very same rationale supports the Exception, 
because by exercising the power of judicial review according to the 
Exception, SCOTUS would bring the constitutional law of the United 
States into closer alignment with the morality of human rights. 
Assume that the right whose status as a constitutional right is in 
question, R, is part of the morality of human rights; assume, that is, that R 
is internationally recognized—including by the United States—as a human 
right. Because R is part of the morality of human rights, R is a limitation 
on the human right to democratic governance; the human right to 
democratic governance does not entitle a majority to violate R. Therefore, 
the fundamental rationale for the General Rule does not apply: Excluding 
R from the constitutional law of the United States would not bring the 
constitutional law of the United States into closer alignment with the 
morality of human rights. Instead, the fundamental rationale for the 
Exception applies: Because R is part of the morality of human rights, 
including R in the constitutional law of the United States would bring the 
constitutional law of the United States into closer alignment with the 
morality of human rights. If the constitutional law of the United States 
does not include R, there is a moral shortfall in the constitutional law of the 
United States, as evaluated from the perspective of the morality of human 
rights. Imagine the moral shortfall, for example, if the constitutional law of 
the United States did not include the right to freedom of religion. 
With respect to most norms claimed to have constitutional status, 
judicial review exercised according to the General Rule would bring the 
constitutional law of the United States into closer alignment with the 
morality of human rights. But, with respect to some norms (rights) claimed 
to have constitutional status—rights that are part of the morality of human 
rights—judicial review exercised not according to the General Rule but, 
instead, according to the Exception to the General Rule, would bring the 
                                                                                                                     
11 Id. at 48–50. 
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constitutional law of the United States into closer alignment with the 
morality of human rights. 
Assume that in a case before SCOTUS, however, the serious question 
is not, or not only, whether the norm the challenged government action is 
claimed to violate has constitutional status. Assume that even if it is well 
established that the norm has constitutional status, there is a serious 
question whether the government action violates the norm. I said above 
that when confronted with that question, SCOTUS should rule in the 
negative if the judgment is at least reasonable that the government action 
does not violate the norm.12 Even if the norm the government action is 
claimed to violate is a constitutional right that is part of the morality of 
human rights, SCOTUS should rule in the negative on the question 
whether the challenged government action violates the right if the 
judgment is reasonable that the government action does not violate the 
right. So ruling would bring the constitutional law of the United States into 
closer alignment with the morality of human rights—more precisely, into 
closer alignment with the human right to democratic governance. 
_________________________ 
 
Again, I defend the foregoing theory of judicial review in A Global 
Political Morality. Now, let’s pursue the implications of the theory for the 
two constitutional rights and the two constitutional controversies that are 
the principal subject matter of this Article.13 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION AS THE HUMAN 
RIGHT TO MORAL EQUALITY14 
The constitutional right to equal protection—by which I mean the 
particular right to “the equal protection of the laws” that is protected by the 
constitutional law of the United States15—forbids government, federal as 
                                                                                                                     
12 See supra text accompanying note 3 (denoting the instances in which the Supreme Court should 
rule against government action or a challenged law that is claimed to violate particular constitutional 
norms). 
13 As I explain in A Global Political Morality, the implications of the theory for District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), are 
that both cases were wrongly decided. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1, at 113–
15. For an argument relying on the theory that capital punishment is “cruel and unusual” in violation of 
the Constitution, see id. at 124–28. 
14 The constitutional right to equal protection has been a principal interest of mine since the 
beginning of my scholarly career. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of 
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 541–42 (1977) (critiquing aspects of the Supreme 
Court decision in Washington v. Davis as failing to address systemic aspects of racial discrimination); 
Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
1023, 1024–25 (1979) [hereinafter Perry, Modern Equal Protection] (providing an appraisal of 
“modern equal protection doctrine” by focusing on unifying principles of equal protection cases). 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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well as state, to deny equal protection to any person. What sort (or sorts) of 
government action denies equal protection to a person? As I am about to 
explain, the human right to moral equality—which is a fundamental part of 
the global political morality of human rights—is the core of the 
constitutional right to equal protection: Any government action that 
violates the human right to moral equality denies equal protection to a 
person—and thereby violates the constitutional right to equal protection. 
A. The Human Right to Moral Equality 
What is the human right to moral equality—and what sort of 
government action violates the right? 
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins by 
affirming that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights” and then goes on to state that all human beings “should act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”16 According to Article 1, every 
human being is as worthy as every other human being—no human being is 
less worthy than any other human being—of being treated “in a spirit of 
brotherhood.”17 Put another way, every human being is as entitled as every 
other human being—every human being is equally entitled—to be treated 
“in a spirit of brotherhood.”18 Thus, the right to moral equality—the right 
of every human being to be treated as the moral equal of every other 
human being, in this sense—as equally entitled with every other human 
being to be treated—as no less worthy than any other human being of 
being treated—“in a spirit of brotherhood.”19 
The most common grounds for demeaning and even dehumanizing 
some human beings, thereby treating them as morally inferior—the most 
common grounds for treating some human beings as less worthy than some 
other human beings, if worthy at all, of being treated “in a spirit of 
brotherhood”20—have been, as listed both in Article 2 of the Universal 
Declaration and in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”21 
                                                                                                                     





21 Id. art. 2; G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26 
(Mar. 23, 1976). See also Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS:  THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993, at 111, 112–16 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 
1993) (attributing dehumanization to a different cultural group’s perceived lack of “rationality”); 
DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, LESS THAN HUMAN: WHY WE DEMEAN, ENSLAVE, AND EXTERMINATE 
OTHERS 15 (2011) (discussing instances of horrific acts facilitated by dehumanizing propaganda); 
David Livingstone Smith, The Essence of Evil, AEON (Oct. 24, 2014), 
 
 
1606 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:5 
 Under the right to moral equality, government may not disadvantage 
any human being based on the view that she—or someone else, someone, 
for example, to whom she is married22—is morally inferior. Similarly, 
government may not disadvantage any human being based on a sensibility 
to the effect that she is morally inferior—a sensibility such as “racially 
selective sympathy and indifference,” namely, “the unconscious failure to 
extend to a [racial] minority the same recognition of humanity, and hence 
the same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to one’s own 
group.”23 Or, analogously, a sensibility such as sex-selective sympathy and 
indifference. Government is disadvantaging a human being based at least 
partly on such a view or sensibility if but for that illicit, demeaning view or 
sensibility, government would not be disadvantaging her. 
The right to moral equality entails not only that government may not 
deny to any human being the status of citizenship based on the view (or on 
a sensibility to the effect) that she is morally inferior; it also entails the 
right to equal citizenship: Government may not disadvantage any citizen 
based on the view that she is morally inferior.24 So, for example, 
government may not abridge—it may not dilute much less deny—any 
citizen’s right to vote based on the view that she is morally inferior. 
The right to moral equality obviously “does not require—no sensible 
right requires—government to treat all human beings the same [as every 
other human being.]”25 Government need not permit children to vote—or 
to drive cars. Nor need government distribute food stamps to the affluent. 
And so on. The examples are countless. But what government may not do 
is deny a benefit to anyone or impose a cost on anyone—government may 
not disadvantage any human being—based on the view (or on a sensibility 
                                                                                                                     
http://aeon.co/magazine/society/how-does-dehumanisation-work/ (positing that dehumanization means 
literally conceiving of others as subhuman). 
22 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing marriage as a fundamental right). In 
response to “a now-discredited argument in defense of antimiscegenation laws”—namely, that “whites 
can marry only within their race; nonwhites can marry only within their race; therefore, 
antimiscegenation laws do not deny ‘equal options,’”—John Corvino has written: 
Putting aside the problematic assumption of two and only two racial groups—whites 
and nonwhites—the argument does have a kind of formal parity to it. The reason 
that we regard its conclusion as objectionable nevertheless is that we recognize that 
the very point of antimiscegenation laws is to signify and maintain the false and 
pernicious belief that nonwhites are morally inferior to whites (that is, unequal). 
John Corvino, Homosexuality and the PIB Argument, 115 ETHICS 501, 509 (2005). 
23 Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. I, 7–8 
(1976). 
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to the effect) that she is morally inferior26 or less worthy than someone 
else, if worthy at all, of being treated “in a spirit of brotherhood.”27 
As (in part) a right against government, the right to moral equality is 
often articulated as the right to “the equal protection of the law.”28 Some 
examples include: 
• Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: “All persons are equal before the law 
and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination on 
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”29 
• The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
states, in Article 2, that “[e]very individual shall be 
entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without 
distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, 
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other 
status”;30 the Charter then states, in Article 3: “1. Every 
individual shall be equal before the law. 2. Every 
individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the 
law.”31 
• Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms: “Every individual is equal before and under 
the law and has the right to the equal protection and 
equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national 
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.”32 
• Article 9 of the South African Constitution: “1. Everyone 
is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law. . . . 3. The state may 
                                                                                                                     
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 105. 
28 Id. at 106. 
29 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 26. 
30 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 2, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 246. 
31 Id. art 3. 
32 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, c 15(1) (U.K.).  
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not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”33 
B. The Constitutional Right to Equal Protection 
Like the preceding provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States—specifically, the second sentence of 
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment—speaks, inter alia, of equal 
protection: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.34 
When they added the foregoing language to the Constitution, what norms 
did the enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalize; what 
rights did they entrench? That question has been and remains contested.35 
However, the ongoing controversy about precisely what rights the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s enactors entrenched matters little as a practical 
matter, because notwithstanding the controversy, it is now constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
33 S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
35 The literature is voluminous. For a small sampling, see Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, 
Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2011) (“The widespread agreement 
among all interpreters of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is that the [Civil Rights Act of 1866] was later 
constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment, but there is disagreement about whether it is 
significant that the Fourteenth Amendment used broader terms than the 1866 Act.”); and Michael J. 
Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 1881, 1899 (1995) (criticizing the view which assumes that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed to ban public school segregation). Cf. Adam Gopnik, How the South Won the Civil War, NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/04/08/how-the-south-won-the-
civil-war. 
There is no shortage of radical egalitarian thought at the time, coming from figures 
who were by no means marginalized. Thaddeus Stevens chose to be buried in an 
integrated cemetery, with the inscription on his stone reading “Finding other 
Cemeteries limited as to Race by Charter Rules, I have chosen this that I might 
illustrate in my death, the Principles which I advocated through a long life: 
EQUALITY OF MAN BEFORE HIS CREATOR.” 
Id. For my own effort, years ago, to discern what rights the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactors 
entrenched when they added section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the equal protection 
clause, to the Constitution of the United States, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 48–50 (1999) [hereinafter PERRY, WE THE 
PEOPLE]. 
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bedrock that the human right to moral equality is the core of the right to 
equal protection that is protected by the constitutional law of the United 
States. 
Assume, for the sake of discussion, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
enactors did not constitutionalize the right to moral equality. Now imagine 
a law—any law—that fits this profile: based on one or another view to the 
effect that some persons (members of a racial minority, for example, or 
women, or children born out of wedlock) are morally inferior. The 
Supreme Court of the United States would not dream of ruling that any 
such law—or any other government action based on any such view—
complies with the constitutional right to equal protection.36 Not even in its 
notorious “separate but equal” opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,37 decided 
almost one hundred and twenty-five years ago, in 1896, did the Supreme 
Court deny that a law or other government action based on the view that 
one or more persons are by virtue of their race morally inferior violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Court implausibly denied that the law 
at issue in the case was based on such a view: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s 
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race 
chooses to put that construction upon it.38 
In his passionate, prophetic dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan articulated the 
true significance of the challenged law: 
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in 
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. 
There is no caste here. . . . What can more certainly arouse 
race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling 
of distrust between these races, than state enactments, which, 
in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so 
inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in 
public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will 
                                                                                                                     
36 In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he clear and central purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in 
the States.” 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (emphasis added). Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 88 (2012) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause . . . 
can reasonably be thought to prohibit all laws designed to assert the separateness and superiority of the 
white race, even those that purport to treat the races equally.”). 
37 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
38 Id. at 551. 
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admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted 
in Louisiana.39 
Sixteen years before its decision in Plessy, and just twelve years after 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court, in Strauder 
v. West Virginia, wrote: 
The very fact that colored people are singled out and 
expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the 
administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, 
though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully 
qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the 
law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that 
race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to 
individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims 
to secure to all others.40 
The human right to moral equality, in the guise of the constitutional 
right to equal protection, is clearly a bedrock feature—and has long been a 
bedrock feature—of the constitutional law of the United States.41  It is also 
constitutional bedrock that the right to equal protection applies to the 
federal government as well as to the states.42 
                                                                                                                     
39 Id. at 559–60 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
40 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (emphasis added). 
41 For a collection of the relevant caselaw, see, for example, JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 1359–1551 (12th ed. 2015); KATHLEEN 
M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 616–767 (18th ed. 2013). 
A question for constitutional historians: How is it that the human right to moral equality, in the 
guise of the constitutional right to equal protection, became a bedrock feature of the constitutional law 
of the United States? Cf. David L. Sloss, How International Human Rights Transformed the US 
Constitution, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 426, 445–48 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Brown and Bolling were driven by a combination of foreign policy, domestic politics, and 
psychological factors, not by the UN Charter). 
42 See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (“We hold that racial segregation in the 
public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution.”). 
The so-called “rationality” (or “rational basis”) requirement is one of the most familiar aspects of 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine. For a collection of the relevant caselaw, see CHOPER ET 
AL., supra note 41, at 1332–51; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 602–16. That requirement is 
best understood as an implication of the right to moral equality: If it is not “rational”—reasonable or 
plausible—to believe that a particular instance of government’s disadvantaging some persons relative 
to some other persons serves a “legitimate” government interest; if it is not “rational” to believe that a 
particular instance of such disadvantaging serves, in other words, any aspect of the common good, then 
presumably government, even if it is not doing anything otherwise constitutionally problematic, is 
simply “playing favorites” (by disfavoring some persons relative to some others) and thereby violating 
the right to moral equality. As a federal appeals court put the point in 2008, “mere economic 
protectionism for the sake of economic protectionism is irrational with respect to determining if a 
classification survives rational basis review. . . . [E]conomic protectionism for its own sake, regardless 
of its relation to the common good, cannot be said to be in furtherance of a legitimate governmental 
interest.” Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991–92 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also 
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It bears emphasis that the constitutional right to equal protection, 
because its core is the human right to moral equality, forbids more than 
racist government action. The right forbids any government action that 
fails to treat some persons as the moral equals of some other persons—that 
fails to treat some persons as entitled to the same respect and concern to 
which other persons are entitled. So, for example, the Supreme Court has 
struck down many laws based on what the Court recently described as 
“overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are[,] . . . about 
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”43 
Government action based on such a generalization violates the 
constitutional right to equal protection if in the Court’s judgment, 
government, by relying on the generalization, treats some persons—often 
(some) women, but sometimes (some) men44—in a demeaning way—a 
way that, all things considered, does not respect, that discounts if not 
disregards, their welfare or abilities—thereby failing to treat them as moral 
equals. Demeaning government action of a sexist sort, no less than that of a 
racist sort, violates the constitutional right to equal protection. 
Because, as historical experience teaches, government reliance on 
“overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are” is so often 
demeaning, it makes sense for the Supreme Court to do what it does with 
respect to every instance of such reliance at issue before the Court: 
Presume that government’s reliance on the generalization is demeaning 
                                                                                                                     
St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013) (“mere economic protection of a 
particular industry is [not] a legitimate governmental purpose”). Cf. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal 
Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 247–48 (1997) (“[Equal 
protection forbids] the state to single out any person or group of persons for special benefits or burdens 
without an adequate ‘public purpose’ justification.”). For a recent discussion of how the rationality 
requirement is being applied in the federal courts, see Rational Basis Review—Substantive Due 
Process—Eighth Circuit Upholds Licensing Requirement for African-Style Hair Braiders—Niang v. 
Carroll, 879 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2018), 131 HARV. L. REV. 2453, 2453–56 (2018) (“Recently, in Niang 
v. Carroll, the Eighth Circuit applied rational basis review in upholding the constitutionality of 
Missouri laws that prohibit braiding hair for pay without a cosmetology license.” (internal footnote 
omitted)). 
That the human right to moral equality is the core of the constitutional right to equal protection 
does not mean that, as a matter of existing constitutional doctrine, the former right exhausts the content 
of the latter right. The Supreme Court has struck down some laws on the basis of the constitutional 
right to equal protection without regard to whether the law was based on the view that some persons are 
morally inferior. That aspect of the Court’s equal protection doctrine—the so-called “fundamental 
interests” aspect—is not my concern here. For a collection of the relevant caselaw, see, for example, 
CHOPER ET AL., supra note 41, at 1551–1644; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 767–809. 
43 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1683–84 (2017). For insightful commentary on 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Morales-Santana—an opinion that spoke for six members of the 
Court including herself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor—
see Linda Greenhouse, Justice Ginsburg and the Price of Equality, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/opinion/ruth-bader-ginsburg-supreme-court.html.  
44 See, e.g., Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1698, 1700–01 (explaining that the Constitution 
“requires the Government to respect the equal dignity and stature of its male and female citizens”).  
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and require government, if it is to succeed in rebutting the presumption, to 
provide the Court with “an exceedingly persuasive justification:”45 a 
justification that persuades the Court that government’s reliance on the 
generalization is not demeaning, that it does not disrespect or discount, the 
welfare or abilities—the “talents, capacities, or preferences”— any women 
or men.46 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY AS THE HUMAN RIGHT TO 
MORAL FREEDOM 
I explained in the preceding section of this Article that the 
constitutional right to equal protection is, at its core, the human right to 
moral equality. I explain in this section that the constitutional right of 
privacy—by which I mean the particular “right of privacy” (as it’s called) 
that is protected by the constitutional law of the United States—is best 
understood as a version of the human right to moral freedom, which, like 
the human right to moral equality, is a fundamental part of the global 
political morality of human rights. 
                                                                                                                     
45 Id. at 1683. 
46 Id. at 1684. Consider the implications of the fact that:  
[U]nder the human right to moral equality, government may not disadvantage any 
human being based either on the view that she is morally inferior or on a sensibility 
to that effect—a sensibility such as “racially selective sympathy and indifference,” 
namely, “the unconscious failure to extend to a [racial] minority the same 
recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter 
of course to one’s own group.” Government action can violate the right to moral 
equality—and, therefore, the right to equal protection—unintentionally. As Robin 
Kar and John Lindo have explained: “Many people who treat each other differently . 
. . exhibit unconscious patterns of attention, inference and concern, which make it 
easier for them to identify the interests of their in-group while overlooking those of 
out-groups. This explains why democratic processes cannot be relied upon to 
guarantee the equal treatment of persons under the law.” 
PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1, at 61 (quoting Robin Bradley Kar & John 
Lindo, Race and Law in the Genomic Age: A Problem for Equal Treatment under the Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION & TECHNOLOGY 874, 902 (Roger Brownsword, Eloise 
Scotford & Karen Yeung eds., 2017)). For further discussion about minds and “us versus them” 
perception, see DANIEL M. WEGNER & KURT GRAY, THE MIND CLUB: WHO THINKS, WHAT FEELS, 
AND WHY IT MATTERS 125–31, 152–55 (2016). Kar and Lindo conclude—rightly conclude—that the 
Supreme Court should “revise its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause [so as to allow] for 
broader and more vigorous constitutional protection against disparate impact caused by either 
intentional discrimination or psychological processes that regularly function to cause disparate 
treatment.” Kar and Lindo, supra, at 905 (emphasis added). I reached the same conclusion in two of my 
earliest writings: Perry, Modern Equal Protection, supra note 14, at 1040–42; Perry, The 
Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, supra note 14, at 588–89. Cf. Osagie K. 
Obasogie, The Supreme Court Is Afraid of Racial Justice, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/opinion/the-supreme-court-is-afraid-of-racial-justice.html 
(discussing the “intent doctrine” created by the Supreme Court beginning with Washington v. Davis).  
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I begin by explicating the human right to moral freedom, which is the 
right to the freedom to live one’s life in accord with one’s moral 
convictions and commitments—including, of course, one’s 
religiously-based moral convictions and commitments (if one has such 
convictions and commitments). 
A. The Human Right to Moral Freedom 
The articulation of the human right to moral freedom in Article 18 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is 
canonical: As of July 2019, 173 of the 197 members of the United Nations 
(87%) are parties to the ICCPR, including, as of 1992, the United States.47 
Article 18 states: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom 
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair 
his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, 
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
have respect for the liberty of parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and 
moral education of their children in conformity with their 
own convictions.48 
                                                                                                                     
47 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 18.  
48 Id. Article 18 of the ICCPR is an elaboration of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948).  
Another international document merits mention: The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly on November 25, 1981. G.A. Res. 36/55, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Nov. 25, 1981). See John Witte, Jr., 
Introduction: The Foundations and Frontiers of Religious Liberty, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 2–5 
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Note the breadth of the right that according to Article 18 “[e]veryone 
shall have the right to freedom” not just of “religion” but also of 
“conscience.”49 The “right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice and teaching.”50 Article 18 explicitly 
indicates that “belief” centrally includes moral belief when it states that 
“[t]he State parties to the [ICCPR] undertake to have respect for the liberty 
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to assure the religious and 
moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.”51 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee—the body that 
monitors compliance with the ICCPR and, under the First Optional 
                                                                                                                     
(2007) (discussing the 1981 U.N. Declaration and its impact on religious rights and liberties).   
Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms is substantially identical: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, opened for 
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights is also substantially identical: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. This right 
includes freedom to maintain or to change one’s religion or beliefs, and 
freedom to profess or disseminate one’s religion or beliefs, either individually 
or together with others, in public or in private. 
2. No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to 
maintain or to change his religion or beliefs. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only to the 
limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others. 
4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide for the 
religious and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with 
their own convictions. 
American Convention on Human Rights art. 12, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.  
49 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 18. 
50 Id. (emphasis added). 
51 Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Religion and Children’s Rights, in 
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 300–04 (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds., 2012) (discussing 
the emerging concept of children’s rights as human rights and the religious rights of children within 
international law).   
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Protocol to the ICCPR, adjudicates cases brought by one or more 
individuals alleging that a state party is in violation of the ICCPR52—has 
stated that “[t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion . . . 
in article 18.1 is far-reaching and profound.”53 How “far-reaching and 
profound?” The right protects not only freedom to practice one’s religion, 
including, of course, one’s religiously-based morality; it also protects 
freedom to practice one’s morality—freedom to “to manifest his . . . belief 
in . . . practice”—even if one’s morality is not religiously-based. As the 
Human Rights Committee has explained: 
The Committee draws the attention of States parties to the 
fact that the freedom of thought and the freedom of 
conscience are protected equally with the freedom of religion 
and belief. . . . Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and 
atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any 
religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” are to be 
broadly construed.  Article 18 is not limited in its application 
to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with 
institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of 
traditional religions.54 
In deriving a right to conscientious objection to military service from 
Article 18, the Human Rights Committee observed that “the [legal] 
obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of 
conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief” and 
emphasized that “there shall be no differentiation among conscientious 
objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs.”55 
It is misleading, though common, to describe the right we are 
discussing here as the right to religious freedom.56 Given the breadth of the 
right—the “far-reaching and profound” right of which the ICCPR’s Article 
18 is the canonical articulation—is more accurately described as the right 
to moral freedom, As the Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized, it is a 
                                                                                                                     
52 ALEX CONTE & RICHARD BURCHILL, DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 8 (2d ed. 2009). 
53 O.H.C.H.R., Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, general cmt. 22, at 35 (July 29, 1994), 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G94/189/63/PDF/G9418963.pdf?OpenElement 
[hereinafter General Comment 22]. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 38; see Yoon and Choi v. Republik of Korea, CCPR/C/88/D/1321-1322/2004, Views of 
the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 8.3 (Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.wri-irg.org/node/6221 (ruling that 
Article 18 requires that parties to the ICCPR provide for conscientious objection to military service). 
For relevant discussion, see JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF 
CONSCIENCE 89–91 (Jane Marie Todd trans., 2011). 
56 For an example of such a description, see Christopher McCrudden, Catholicism, Human Rights 
and the Public Sphere, 5 INT’L J. PUB. THEOLOGY 331, 333–35 (2011). 
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broad right that protects freedom to practice one’s morality without regard 
to whether one’s morality is religiously-based. Referring to section 2(a) of 
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states that “[e]veryone 
has . . . freedom of conscience and religion,”57 the Court has explained: 
“The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with 
profoundly personal beliefs that govern one’s perception of oneself, 
humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. 
These beliefs, in turn, govern one’s conduct and practices.”58 Section 2(a) 
“means that, subject to [certain limitations], no one is to be forced to act in 
a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.”59 Therefore, I call the right 
we are discussing here the human right to moral freedom. But whatever 
one calls the right—whether one calls it, as many do, the right to freedom 
of conscience, in the sense of the right to live one’s life in accord with the 
deliverances of one’s conscience, or, instead, the right to moral (including 
religious) freedom—it is the right to the freedom to live one’s life in 
accord with one’s moral convictions and commitments, including one’s 
religiously-based moral convictions and commitments. 
  Moreover, that one is not—and understands that one is not—
religiously and/or morally obligated to make a particular choice about what 
to do or to refrain from doing does not entail that the choice is not 
protected by the right to moral freedom. As the Canadian Supreme Court 
has explained, in a case involving a religious practice: 
[T]o frame the right either in terms of objective religious 
“obligation” or even as the sincere subjective belief that an 
obligation exists and that the practice is required . . . would 
disregard the value of non-obligatory religious experiences 
by excluding those experiences from protection. Jewish 
women, for example, strictly speaking, do not have a 
biblically mandated “obligation” to dwell in a succah during 
the Succot holiday. If a woman, however, nonetheless 
sincerely believes that sitting and eating in a succah brings 
her closer to her Maker, is that somehow less deserving of 
recognition simply because she has no strict “obligation” to 
do so? Is the Jewish yarmulke or Sikh turban worthy of less 
recognition simply because it may be borne out of religious 
custom, not obligation? Should an individual Jew, who may 
                                                                                                                     
57 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
58 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 759 (Can.). 
59 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 337 (Can.); see also Howard Kislowicz, 
Richard Haigh & Adrienne Ng, Calculations of Conscience: The Costs and Benefits of Religious and 
Conscientious Freedom, 48 ALTA. L. REV. 679, 707–13 (2011) (discussing the intersection of “freedom 
of conscience” and freedom of religion in the decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada). 
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personally deny the modern relevance of literal biblical 
“obligation” or “commandment”, be precluded from making 
a freedom of religion argument despite the fact that for some 
reason he or she sincerely derives a closeness to his or her 
God by sitting in a succah? Surely not.60 
“It is the religious or spiritual essence of an action,” reasoned the Court, 
“not any mandatory or perceived-as-mandatory nature of its observance, 
that attracts protection.”61 
But by the same token—that is, because “[i]t is the religious or 
spiritual essence of an action . . . that attracts protection”—not every 
choice one makes or wants to make qualifies as a choice protected by the 
right to moral freedom. A choice to do or not to do something is protected 
by the right if, and only if, the choice fits this profile: animated by what 
Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, in their book Secularism and 
Freedom of Conscience, call “core or meaning-giving beliefs and 
commitments” as distinct from “the legitimate but less fundamental 
‘preferences’ we display as individuals.”62 
[The] beliefs that engage my conscience and the values with 
which I most identify, and those that allow me to find my 
way in a plural moral space, must be distinguished from my 
desires, tastes, and other personal preferences, that is, from 
all things liable to contribute to my well-being but which I 
could forgo without feeling as if I were betraying myself or 
straying from the path I have chosen. The nonfulfillment of a 
desire may upset me, but it generally does not impinge on the 
bedrock values and beliefs that define me in the most 
fundamental way; it does not inflict “moral harm.”63 
Although, as Maclure and Taylor are well aware, “it is difficult to 
establish in the abstract where the line between preferences and core 
commitments lies,”64 I am inclined to concur in what Maclure and Taylor 
have argued: 
Whereas it is not overly controversial to classify beliefs 
stemming from established philosophical, spiritual, or 
religious doctrines as meaning-giving, what about the more 
fluid and fragmented field of values? Should the person who 
                                                                                                                     
60 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 588 (Can.). 
61 Id. at 553. 
62 MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 55, at 12–13. For Maclure and Taylor’s elaboration and 
discussion of the distinction, see id. at 76–77, 89–97. For a functionally similar distinction, see ROBERT 
AUDI, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 42–43 (2011). 
63  MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 55, at 77. 
64 Id. at 92. 
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has her heart set on attending to a loved one in the terminal 
stage of life be classified with the . . . Muslim who is intent 
on honoring her moral obligations? The answer to that 
question is likely yes. It is unclear why a hierarchy ought to 
be created between, on one hand, convictions stemming from 
established secular or religious doctrines and, on the other, 
values that do not originate in any totalizing system of 
thought. Why, in order to be “core,” “fundamental,” or 
“meaning-giving,” must a conviction originate in a doctrine 
based on exegetical and apologetic texts? Moreover, 
attending to an ailing loved one is for some people an 
experience charged with meaning, one that leads them to face 
their own finitude and incites them to reassess their values 
and commitments . . . . A man may very well come to believe 
that if he cannot devote himself to his gravely ill wife or 
child, his life has no meaning, but he may not necessarily 
conduct a sustained metaphysical reflection on human 
existence . . . . [W]e believe it is rather the intensity of a 
person’s commitment to a given conviction or practice that 
constitutes the similarity between religious convictions and 
secular convictions.65 
Wherever “in the abstract” the line “between preferences and core 
commitments” is drawn, there will be cases in which the distinction is 
relatively easy to administer. For example: 
[A] Muslim nurse’s decision to wear a scarf at work cannot 
be placed on the same footing with a colleague’s choice to 
wear a baseball cap. In the first case the woman feels an 
obligation—to deviate from it would go against a practice 
that contributes toward defining her, she would be betraying 
herself, and her sense of integrity would be violated—which 
is not normally the case for her colleague.66 
And there will be cases in which there is room for reasonable doubt about 
which side of the line a choice falls on. Wouldn’t a generous application of 
the right to moral freedom involve resolving the benefit of the doubt in 
favor of the conclusion that the choice at issue is animated by “core or 
meaning-giving beliefs and commitments”—and is therefore protected by 
the right? 
A generous application of the right—more precisely, a default rule 
according to which the benefit of the doubt is resolved in favor of the 
                                                                                                                     
65 Id. at 92–93, 96, 97. 
66 Id. at 77.  
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conclusion that the choice at issue is protected by the right—is much more 
feasible than it would be were the protection provided by the right 
unconditional (“absolute”). However, the protection provided by the right 
to moral freedom is only conditional. The protection provided by some 
ICCPR rights—such as the Article 7 right not to “be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”—is 
unconditional, in the sense that the rights forbid (or require) government to 
do something, period.67 The protection provided by some other ICCPR 
rights, by contrast, is conditional, in the sense that the rights forbid 
government to do something unless certain conditions are satisfied.68 As 
Article 18 makes clear, the protection provided by the right to moral 
freedom is—as a practical matter, it must be—conditional: The right 
forbids government to ban or otherwise impede conduct protected 
(“covered”) by the right, thereby interfering with one’s freedom to live 
one’s life in accord with one’s moral convictions and commitments, unless 
each of three conditions is satisfied:69 
• The legitimacy condition: The government action (law, 
policy, etc.) must be an effort to achieve, and actually 
achieve, a legitimate government objective: “public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others.”70 The particular government 
action at issue might be not the law (policy, etc.) itself 
but that the law does not exempt the protected conduct. 
• The least-restrictive-alternative condition: The 
government action—which, again, might be that the law 
does not exempt—must be necessary, in the sense that 
there is no less restrictive way to achieve the objective.71 
• The proportionality condition: The overall good the 
government action achieves—the “benefit” of the 
government action—must be sufficiently important to 
warrant the gravity of the action’s “cost,” which is a 
                                                                                                                     
67 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 7 (“No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one 
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”). 
68 See, e.g., id. art. 18 (providing a right to freedom of religion subject to enumerated conditions). 
69 Id. 
70 See The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 3, 4 (1985) [hereinafter The Siracusa 
Principles] (“10. Whenever a limitation is required in the terms of the Covenant to be “necessary,” this 
term implies that the limitation: (a) is based on one of the grounds justifying limitations recognized by 
the relevant article of the Covenant, . . . [and] (c) pursues a legitimate aim . . . .”). 
71 Id. (“11. In applying a limitation, a state shall use no more restrictive means than are required 
for the achievement of the purpose of the limitation.”). 
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function mainly of the importance of the conduct the 
government action bans or otherwise impedes and the 
extent to which there is an alternative way (or ways) for 
the aggrieved party (or parties) to achieve what she wants 
to achieve.72 
It is an essential aspect of the conditional human right to moral freedom 
that government action that implicates the right also violates the right if, 
and only if, the government action fails to satisfy any of those three 
conditions. 
Consider the first of the three conditions that government must satisfy, 
under the right to moral freedom, lest its regulation of conduct protected by 
the right violate the right: The government action at issue (law, policy, 
etc.) must serve a legitimate government objective.73 Article 18 sensibly 
and explicitly allows government to act for the purpose of protecting 
“public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others.”74 Clearly, then, for purposes of the legitimacy 
condition, protecting “public morals” is a legitimate government 
objective.75 
But what morals count as public morals? In addressing that question, 
let’s begin with The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which were promulgated by the United Nations in 1984, and which state, 
in relevant part: 
2. The scope of a limitation referred to in the Covenant 
shall not be interpreted so as to jeopardize the essence of 
the right concerned. 
3. All limitation clauses shall be interpreted strictly and in 
favor of the rights at issue. 
4. All limitations shall be interpreted in the light and 
context of the particular right concerned. 76 
                                                                                                                     
72 The right to moral freedom, obviously, would not provide meaningful protection for conduct 
covered by the right if the consistency of government action with the right was to be determined 
without regard to whether the benefit of the government action is proportionate to the cost of the 
government action. And, indeed, Article 18 is authoritatively understood to require that the benefit be 
proportionate to the cost. See id. (“10. Whenever a limitation is required in the terms of the Covenant to 
be “necessary,” this term implies that the limitation: . . . (b) responds to a pressing public or social 
need, . . . and (d) is proportionate to that aim.”).  
73 Id. 
74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 18. 
75 Id.  
76 The Siracusa Principles, supra note 70, at 4.  
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With respect to “public morals,” therefore, the Human Rights Committee 
has emphasized: 
[T]he concept of morals derives from many social, 
philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, 
limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for 
the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles 
not deriving exclusively from a single tradition. . . . If a set of 
beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, 
proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this 
shall not result in any impairment of the freedoms under 
article 18 or any other rights recognized under the Covenant 
nor in any discrimination against persons who do not accept 
the official ideology or who oppose it.77 
As the editors of a casebook on the ICCPR have put the point, in 
summarizing several statements by the Human Rights Committee 
concerning protection of “public morals” under the right to moral freedom: 
“‘[P]ublic morals’ measures should reflect a pluralistic view of society, 
rather than a single religious culture.”78 
The position of the Human Rights Committee—the Committee’s 
application of the relevant Siracusa Principles in the context of the Article 
18 right to moral freedom—is quite sound, given what Taylor and Maclure 
call “the state of contemporary societies.”79 Such societies—more 
precisely, contemporary democracies—are typically quite pluralistic, 
morally as well as religiously: 
Religious diversity must be seen as an aspect of the 
phenomenon of “moral pluralism” with which contemporary 
democracies have to come to terms . . . Although the history 
of the West serves to explain the fixation on religion . . . the 
state of contemporary societies requires that we move beyond 
that fixation and consider how to manage fairly the moral 
diversity that now characterizes them. The field of 
application for secular governance has broadened to include 
all moral, spiritual, and religious options.80 
                                                                                                                     
77 General Comment 22, supra note 53, at 35. 
78 SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 379 (2000). 
79 MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 55, at 106. 
80 Id. at 10, 106. “‘Moral pluralism’ refers to the phenomenon of individuals adopting different 
and sometimes incompatible value systems and conceptions of the good.” Id. at 10. See also Charles 
Taylor, Democratic Exclusions: Political Identity and the Problem of Secularism, ABC RELIGION & 
ETHICS (Sept. 17, 2017, 2:13 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/religion/democratic-exclusions-political-
identity-and-the-problem-of-secu/10095352 (illustrating the goal of a modern, secular democratic 
government and resulting societal implications). 
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If in banning or otherwise regulating (impeding) conduct purportedly 
in order to protect “public morals,” government is acting based on—“based 
on” in the sense that government almost certainly would not be doing what 
it is doing “but for”—a sectarian belief, whether religious or secular 
(nonreligious), that the conduct is immoral, government is not truly acting 
to protect public morals. Instead, government is acting to protect sectarian 
morals, and protecting sectarian morals—as distinct from public morals—
is not a legitimate government objective under the right to moral freedom. 
Crediting the protection of sectarian morals as a legitimate government 
objective, under the right to moral freedom, would be antithetical to the 
goal of enabling contemporary democracies to meet the challenge of 
“manag[ing] fairly the moral diversity that now characterizes them.”81 We 
can anticipate an argument to the effect that managing such diversity is 
only one of the challenges that contemporary democracies face, that 
nurturing social unity is another, and that from time to time, in one or 
another place, meeting the latter challenge may require the political 
powers-that-be to protect some aspect of a sectarian morality.82 However, 
such an argument is belied by the historical experience of the world’s 
                                                                                                                     
Everyone agrees today that modern, diverse democracies have to be secular, in some 
sense of this term. But [in] what sense? . . . [T]he main point of a secularist regime is 
to manage the religious and metaphysical-philosophical diversity of views 
(including non-and anti-religious views) fairly and democratically. Of course, this 
task will include setting certain limits to religiously-motivated action in the public 
sphere, but it will also involve similar limits on those espousing non- or 
anti-religious philosophies. . . . For this view, religion is not the prime focus of 
secularism. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
81 MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1, at 76. 
82 In 1931, the fascist dictator of Italy, Benito Mussolini, proclaimed that “religious unity is one of 
the great strengths of a people.” JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE 
155–56 (2005). Had Mussolini read Machiavelli? “Machiavelli . . . called religion ‘the instrument 
necessary above all others for the maintenance of a civilized state,’ [and who] urged rulers to ‘foster 
and encourage’ religion ‘even though they be convinced that it is quite fallacious.’ Truth and social 
utility may, but need not, coincide.” Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at 
the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2182 (2003) (quoting 
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 143 (Bernard R. Crick ed., Leslie J. Walker trans., Penguin 
1970) (1520)). Cf. Atheist Defends Belief in God, TABLET [London], Mar. 24, 2007 (quoting a former 
Communist praising the Pope). 
A senior German ex-Communist has praised the Pope and defended belief in God as 
necessary for society . . . “I’m convinced only the Churches are in a state to 
propagate moral norms and values,” said Gregor Gysi, parliamentary chairman of 
Die Linke, a grouping of Germany’s Democratic Left Party (PDS) and other 
left-wing groups. “I don’t believe in God, but I accept that a society without God 
would be a society without values. This is why I don’t oppose religious attitudes and 
convictions.” 
Id. at 33. 
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democracies, which amply confirms, as Maclure and Taylor emphasize, 
not only that a society’s “unity does not lie in unanimity about the meaning 
and goals of existence but also that any efforts in the direction of such a 
uniformization would have devastating consequences for social peace.”83 
The political powers-that-be do not need—and under the legitimacy 
condition, properly construed, they do not have—discretion to ban or 
otherwise regulate conduct based on a sectarian belief that the conduct is 
immoral.84 
When is a belief, including a secular belief, that X (a type of conduct) 
is immoral, a sectarian belief? Consider what the celebrated American 
Jesuit John Courtney Murray wrote, in the mid-1960s, in his “Memo to 
[Boston’s] Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation:” 
[T]he practice [contraception], undertaken in the interests of 
“responsible parenthood,” has received official sanction by 
many religious groups within the community. It is difficult to 
see how the state can forbid, as contrary to public morality, a 
practice that numerous religious leaders approve as morally 
right. The stand taken by these religious groups may be 
lamentable from the Catholic moral point of view. But it is 
decisive from the point of view of law and jurisprudence . . 
.85 
                                                                                                                     
83 MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 55, at 18. See also Paul Cruickshank, Covered Faces, Open 
Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006 (exploring why, according to the op-ed contributor, the rise in 
number of Muslim women wearing the niquab was “a symptom and not a cause of rising tensions” in 
Britain at the time, which were driven by the Muslim community’s “sense of besiegement”); G.A. Res. 
36/55, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief (Nov. 25, 1981) (stating “the disregard and infringement of . . . the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience, religion or whatever belief, have brought, directly or indirectly, wars and great 
suffering to mankind”). See BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED:  
RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 222 (2011) (arguing “to the 
extent that governments and societies restrict religious freedoms, physical persecution and conflict 
increase”).  
84 That the coercive imposition of sectarian moral belief violates the right to moral freedom does 
not entail that the non-coercive affirmation of theistic belief invariably does so. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, 
THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 103–04, 106 n.19 (2010) (providing examples 
from the United States of the latter: the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance; “In God We 
Trust” as the national motto; and “God save the United States and this honorable court” intoned at the 
beginning of judicial proceedings. I also address the question whether the non-coercive affirmation of 
theistic belief violates the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
85 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Memo to Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation, 
WOODSTOCK THEOLOGICAL LIBR. GEO. U. 83, https://www.library.georgetown.edu/woodstock/ 
murray/1965f. See also John Courtney Murray, S.J., Toledo Talk 344 (May 5, 1967), 
https://www.library.georgetown.edu/woodstock/murray/1967g (reproducing a speech delivered in 
Toledo on May 5, 1967 that reflected Murray’s later views on contraception); Seth Meehan, Legal Aid: 
When the Massachusetts Legislature Voted in 1966 to End the Last All-Out Ban on Contraceptives in 
the Nation, It Was With the Approval and Assistance of the Boston Archdiocese, B.C. MAG. (2011) 
(discussing Murray’s influence on Boston’s Archbishop and Cardinal Richard Cushing, and Cushing’s 
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We may generalize Murray’s insight: A belief that X is immoral is 
sectarian—sectarian in the context of contemporary democracies, which 
are typically quite pluralistic, morally as well as religiously—if the claim 
that X is immoral is one that is widely contested, and in that sense 
sectarian, among the citizens of such a democracy. 
Of course, it will not always be obvious which side of the line a 
particular moral belief falls on—sectarian or nonsectarian—but often it 
will be obvious: Murray understood and emphasized to Cardinal Cushing 
the belief that contraception is immoral had clearly become sectarian. By 
contrast, certain moral beliefs—certain moral norms—are now clearly 
ecumenical, rather than sectarian, in contemporary democracies. Consider, 
in that regard, what Maclure and Taylor say about “popular sovereignty” 
and “basic human rights:” 
[They] are the constitutive values of liberal and democratic 
political systems; they provide these systems with their 
foundation and aims. Although these values are not neutral, 
they are legitimate, because it is they that allow citizens 
espousing very different conceptions of the good to live 
together in peace. They allow individuals to be sovereign in 
their choices of conscience and to define their own life plan 
while respecting others’ right to do the same. That is why 
people with very diverse religious, metaphysical, and secular 
convictions can share and affirm these constitutive values.  
They often arrive at them by very different paths, but they 
come together to defend them.86 
B. The Constitutional Right of Privacy 
I said at the beginning of this section of the Article that the 
constitutional right of privacy is best understood as a version of the human 
right to moral freedom. Consider the following rulings by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the period since the mid-1960s: 
                                                                                                                     
influence on the repeal of the Massachusetts ban on the sale of contraceptives); Seth Meehan, Catholics 
and Contraception: Boston, 1965, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2012), 
https://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/catholics-and-contraception-boston-1965/ 
(discussing the same); Joshua J. McElwee, A Cardinal’s Role in the End of a State’s Ban on 
Contraception, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Feb 28, 2012), https://www.ncronline.org/news/politics/cardinals-
role-end-states-ban-contraception (noting once Cushing gave a tacit go-ahead to state legislators, the 
bill was signed into law on May 10, 1966); LESLIE WOODCOCK TENTLER, CATHOLICS AND 
CONTRACEPTION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 2–3 (2004) (providing a larger context within which Father 
Murray wrote and spoke); David Hollenbach, S.J., Religious Freedom, Morality and Law: John 
Courtney Murray Today, 1 J. MORAL THEOLOGY 69, 70, 74–75 (2012) (providing a recent reflection on 
Murray’s work by one of his foremost intellectual heirs). 
86 MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 55, at 11. 
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• A 1965 ruling and a 1972 ruling, read in conjunction with 
one another, establish that government may ban neither the 
use nor the distribution of contraceptive devices or drugs.87 
In the 1972 ruling, the Supreme Court declared: “If the right 
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”88 
• In 1973, the Court ruled that restrictive abortion legislation 
implicated, and that some such legislation violated, “the right 
of privacy.”89 In 1992, in reaffirming the 1973 ruling, the 
Court explained: 
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we 
suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound 
moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, 
even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find 
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, 
but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to 
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. 
The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can 
resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way 
that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps 
[where] the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or 
health, or is the result of rape or incest. . . . 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing, and education . . . . These 
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right 
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about 
                                                                                                                     
87 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that the state of 
Connecticut’s forbidding of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital 
privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972) (finding “[i]f under Griswold the 
distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to 
unmarried persons would be equally impermissible” and “if Griswold is no bar  to a prohibition on the 
distribution of contraceptives, the State could not, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, 
outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons”). 
88 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
89 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
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these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State.90  
• In 1978, in ruling that “the decision to marry [is] among the 
personal decisions protected by the right of privacy,” the 
Court stated: 
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed 
on the same level of importance as decisions relating to 
procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships 
. . . . [I]t would make little sense to recognize a right of 
privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not 
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is 
the foundation of the family in our society . . . .  
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to 
marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation 
which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites 
for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the 
contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly 
interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship 
may legitimately be imposed. . . . [However, w]hen a 
statutory classification significantly interferes with the 
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it 
is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is 
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.91 
• In 2003, the Court ruled that government may not criminalize 
adult, consensual sexual intimacy and that therefore a 
criminal ban on same-sex sexual intimacy was 
unconstitutional: 
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom 
of . . . certain intimate conduct . . . .  [Government should be 
wary about attempting] to define the meaning of [an adult, 
consensual] relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury 
to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. . . . 
[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship . . . and 
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds 
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the 
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution 
allows homosexual persons to make this choice. . . .	
                                                                                                                     
90 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1992). 
91 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 386, 388 (1978) (citations omitted). 
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[F]or centuries, there have been powerful voices to condemn 
homosexual conduct as immoral. [This does] not answer the 
question before us, however. The issue is whether the 
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these 
views on the whole society through operation of the criminal 
law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.” . . . “[T]hat the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice . . . . [I]ndividual decisions by 
married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical 
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, 
are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection 
extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married 
persons.”92 
The constitutional right of privacy, as the wording in the preceding 
passages confirms, is best understood as a right that protects certain 
fundamental aspects of one’s moral freedom—of one’s freedom, that is, to 
live one’s life in accord with one’s moral convictions and commitments. In 
that sense, and to that extent, the constitutional right of privacy is a version 
of the human right to moral freedom. 
However, that the constitutional right of privacy is a version of the 
human right to moral freedom does not entail that the right of privacy is 
properly regarded as a constitutional right. It has been and remains greatly 
controversial whether the right of privacy is properly regarded as a 
constitutional right.93 
Recall from the first section of this Article that a right, R, is properly 
regarded as a constitutional right if one of the two following conditions is 
satisfied: (1) Constitutional enactors entrenched R in the Constitution of 
the United States; other, later enactors did not entrench a norm that 
supersedes R; and no norm that supersedes R has become constitutional 
bedrock; or (2) R is constitutional bedrock. Recall, too, that in deciding 
whether a norm is properly regarded as a constitutional norm, the Supreme 
Court should rule in the affirmative if (a) the norm in question is a part of 
                                                                                                                     
92 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 567, 571, 577–78 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood, 
505 U.S. at 850); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
93 That the original understanding neither of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause nor of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause supports the Supreme Court’s “right of privacy” 
jurisprudence seems clear. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as 
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1792, 1795 (2012) (discussing how from an originalist 
perspective, it is difficult to extract a fundamental right of privacy from the Constitution). 
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the morality of human rights; and (b) the judgment is reasonable that at 
least one of the two foregoing conditions is satisfied.94 The norm at issue 
here—the right of privacy, understood as a version of the human right to 
moral freedom—is a part of the morality of human rights. The serious 
question is whether one (or both) of the two foregoing conditions is 
satisfied. 
Consider the two following propositions: 
1. It is reasonable to conclude that the right to the free 
exercise of religion that constitutional enactors 
entrenched95 is not what, in 1990, a bare majority of the 
Supreme Court said it is96 (i.e., a narrow right that 
protects against only government action that 
discriminates on the basis of religion).97 Rather, it is a 
broad right that protects against any government action 
that, without adequate justification, impedes one’s ability 
to live one’s life in accord with one’s religious 
convictions and commitments.98 
2. It is well settled—so well settled as to be reasonably 
regarded as constitutional bedrock—that the free exercise 
right covers not only normative worldviews that are 
theistic but also those that, such as Buddhism, are 
nontheistic.99 Like the human right to moral freedom, the 
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion covers 
moral choices rooted in and nourished by one or another 
                                                                                                                     
94 Supra Part I. 
95 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion] . . . .”).  
96 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990). 
97 For a defense of the antidiscrimination interpretation of the free exercise right as historically 
accurate, see Phillip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 947–48 (1992) (outlining how the exemption-focused 
interpretation of the free exercise clause is not supported). 
98 KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: RETHINKING 
RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 301 (2015); 2 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE FREE 
EXERCISE CLAUSE 52–53, 61 (2011) (citations omitted); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and 
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1449 (1990); Michael 
W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1115–16 
(1990); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Justice Scalia’s Worst Opinion, PUB. DISCOURSE (Apr. 17, 2015), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/04/14844/. It is constitutional bedrock that the free exercise 
right applies to the states as well as to the federal government. The Supreme Court first so ruled in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
99 Indeed, including even worldviews that are anti-theistic. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 
495 n.11 (1961) (explaining that “[a]mong religions in this country which do not teach what would 
generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, 
Secular Humanism and others”). 
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nontheistic worldview as well as those rooted in and 
nourished by one or another theistic worldview.100 
Given those two propositions, the right that the Supreme Court has 
(misleadingly) named “the right of privacy”—the right of privacy 
understood as a version of the human right to moral freedom—is properly 
regarded as a constitutional right.101 
IV. ABORTION 
[In the Abortion Cases (1973), the Supreme Court should not 
have] gone beyond a ruling on the extreme [Texas] statute 
before the Court. . . . Heavy-handed judicial intervention was 
difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not 
resolved, conflict.102 
What are the implications of the constitutional right to equal protection 
and the constitutional right of privacy? (The implications of the two rights, 
that is, understood as I have argued here they should be understood.) For 
the two constitutional controversies I address in this Article, which are 
                                                                                                                     
100 See DANIEL O. CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 60–69 (2016) (discussing 
efforts, judicial and scholarly, of how the term “religion,” as used in the First Amendment, should be 
understood). According to religious liberty scholar Douglas Laycock, “we have to understand religion 
broadly, so that nonbelievers are protected when they do things that are analogous to the exercise of 
religion. . . . Nonbelievers have consciences, and occasionally, their deeply held conscientious beliefs 
conflict with government regulation.” Douglas Laycock, McElroy Lecture: Sex, Atheism, and the Free 
Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 431 (2011) (footnote omitted). See also Douglas 
Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 336–37 (1996) (arguing that 
the state should not be drawing lines across a series of religious choices or religious commitments 
because such lines would be inconsistent with religious liberty). 
101 Cf. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 149 (1996): 
By the standards of late twentieth-century law, the public regulation of morality [in 
the United States] is increasingly suspect. The burgeoning public/private distinction, 
the jurisprudential separation of law and morality, and the expansion of 
constitutionally protected rights of expression and privacy have yielded a polity 
whose legitimacy theoretically rests on its ability to keep out of the private moral 
affairs of its citizens. As the American Law Institute declared in the 1955 Model 
Penal Code, “We deem it inappropriate for the government to attempt to control 
behavior that has no substantial significance except as to the morality of the actor.”  
Novak goes on to illustrate that “[t]he relationship between laws and morals in the nineteenth 
century could not have been more different. Of all the contests over public power in that period, morals 
regulation was the easy case.” Id.  
102 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Equality and Autonomy in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 
63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385–86 (1985) (footnote omitted). In 1985, Justice Ginsburg was a judge on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. at 375. 
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among the most divisive constitutional controversies of our time: the 
controversies concerning, respectively, abortion and same-sex marriage.103 
Let’s begin with the controversy concerning abortion: specifically, the 
controversy over the constitutionality of laws that ban pre-viability 
abortions. I first consider an extreme such ban: the Texas statute at issue, 
and struck down, in Roe v. Wade;104 I then consider a ban that, in 
comparison to the Texas statute, was relatively permissive: the Georgia 
statute at issue, and struck down, in Doe v. Bolton.105 
The Texas statute at issue in Roe v. Wade criminalized all abortions 
except those necessary to save the life of the mother.106 The statute 
criminalized even abortions necessary to protect the physical health of the 
mother from a serious threat of grave and irreparable harm, abortions to 
terminate a pregnancy that began with rape, and abortions to terminate a 
pregnancy that will yield a child who, because of a grave defect, is “born 
into what is certain to be a brief life of grievous suffering,”107 or a child 
who, because of the congenital brain disorder known as anencephaly, is 
missing a major portion of its brain and is destined to die—if not before 
birth, when most such children die—then shortly after birth.108 The Texas 
statute was, in a word, extreme. Only a statute that criminalized even those 
abortions that the Texas statute exempted—abortions necessary to save the 
                                                                                                                     
103 In A Global Political Morality, I pursue the implications of the constitutional right of privacy 
for laws banning physician-assisted suicide; I conclude that although they clearly implicate the right of 
privacy, such laws do not violate the right. See PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1, 
at 153–56. 
104 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
105 See 410 U.S. 179, 182–83, 201 (1973) (detailing the exceptions for Georgia’s ban on 
abortions, including if “the pregnancy resulted from forcible or statutory rape”). 
106 Id. at 117–18. 
107 John Schwartz, When Torment Is Baby’s Destiny, Euthanasia Is Defended, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
10, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/health/when-torment-is-babys-destiny-euthanasia-is-
defended.html. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 117–18 (explaining that the only permissible exception under the 
Texas statute was for the purpose of saving the life of the mother). 
108 Brazil: Supreme Court Abortion Ruling a Positive Step, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 19, 2012, 
4:09 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/19/brazil-supreme-court-abortion-ruling-positive-step. 
Anencephaly, often diagnosed when the fetus is in utero, is a neural tube defect in 
which a major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp fail to develop. An infant born 
with this disorder lacks a cerebrum, and will usually be born blind, deaf, and 
unconscious. If an anencephalic infant is not stillborn, the baby will often die within 
hours or days. In a rare case, the infant may survive longer, as in the well-known 
case in Brazil of Marcela Ferreira, who lived for 20 months. But infants with 
anencephaly do not gain consciousness and cannot survive infancy. 
Id. See Eduardo Soares, Brazil: Criminalization of Some Abortions Ruled Unconstitutional, LIBR. 
CONGRESS (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/brazil-criminalization-of-
some-abortions-ruled-unconstitutional/ (explaining that the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court ruled 
unconstitutional a portion of Brazil’s penal code that criminalized abortion of anencephalic babies). 
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mother’s life—would be more extreme. The Texas statute was so extreme 
that it violated the right to equal protection. 
As I explained earlier in this Article, a law based on sex-selective 
sympathy and indifference—based, that is, on a failure to extend to women 
the same recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, 
given as a matter of course to men—violates the human right to moral 
equality; such a law therefore violates the constitutional right to equal 
protection. Even if, from some perspectives, it is admirable (or even 
heroic) for a woman to continue with a pregnancy that poses a serious 
threat of grave and irreparable harm to her physical health, a law that 
coerces her to do so, like a law that bans abortions necessary to protect the 
mother’s life, is so extreme as to be fairly judged to be based on 
sex-selective sympathy and indifference.109 Even if, from some 
perspectives, it is admirable for a woman to continue with a pregnancy that 
began with rape, a law that coerces her to do so is so extreme as to be fairly 
judged to be based on sex-selective sympathy and indifference.110 And 
even if, from some perspectives, it is admirable for a woman to continue 
with a pregnancy that will yield a child who, because of a grave defect, is 
“born into what is certain to be a brief life of grievous suffering”111—or a 
child who is missing a major portion of its brain and is destined to die in 
utero or shortly after birth—a law that coerces her to do so, in spite of the 
fact that the child will die not long after it has been born, is so extreme as 
to be fairly judged to be based on sex-selective sympathy and 
indifference.112 It is not within what Justice Souter called “the zone of 
                                                                                                                     
109 Terminating a post-viability pregnancy that threatens the mother’s life or that poses a serious 
threat of grave and irreparable harm to her physical health does not require that the life of the unborn 
child be terminated. Randy Beck, Overcoming Barriers to the Protection of Viable Fetuses, 71 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1263, 1268–69 (2014); Jeffrey Kluger, A Preemie Revolution: Cutting-Edge Medicine 
and Dedicated Caregivers Are Helping the Tiniest Babies Survive––and Thrive, TIME, June 2, 2014, at 
26–27, 30 (discussing the medical advances surrounding premature birth). In 1998, the New York Times 
reported that because of advances “in neonatology, most experts place the point of fetal viability at 23 
or 24 weeks.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Nation; Shifting Certainties in the Abortion War, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 11, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/11/weekinreview/the-nation-shifting-certainties-in-
the-abortion-war.html. 
110 This is not to suggest that the law must give a woman whose pregnancy began with rape the 
option of waiting until late into her pregnancy to decide to have an abortion. In any event, and as I said 
in the preceding footnote, terminating a post-viability pregnancy does not require that the life of the 
unborn child be terminated. 
111 Schwartz, supra note 107. 
112 Consider, in that regard: In Mellet v. Ireland, the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that in 
the circumstances of the case, Ireland’s forcing a woman to choose between continuing with her 
pregnancy and travelling to another country to terminate her pregnancy violated three articles of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 7 (the right not to be subjected to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment), Article 17 (the right to privacy), and Article 26 (the right to be free 
from sex-based discrimination). Human Rights Comm., CCPR/C/116/D/2324 (Mar. 31, 2016); see 
Fiona de Londras, Introductory Note to Mellet v. Ireland (H.R. Comm.), 56 INT’L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 217, 229–30 (2017) (explaining the Committee’s findings). In this case, Ms. Mellet “was 
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reasonableness”113 to deny that a law that coerces a woman to continue 
with a pregnancy that falls into one of the three categories just described is 
based, in part, on a failure to extend to women the same recognition of 
humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter of 
course to men.114 The Texas statute was so extreme that had it not already 
been on the books in 1973, it is unlikely that it would have been put on the 
books. In any event, because it was so extreme, the statute was based on 
sex-selective sympathy and indifference—and therefore violated the right 
to equal protection. 
A clarification is in order here: To say that a law is based on X—in the 
sense that the law would not have been enacted, or would not be 
maintained, but for X—is not to deny that the law might also be based on 
Y. There can be more than one “but for” rationale for a law. In particular, 
to say that the Texas statute was based in part on a failure to extend to 
women the same recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy 
and care, given as a matter of course to men—and therefore violated the 
right to equal protection—is not to deny that the statute was also based in 
part on a view to the effect that even at the earliest gestational stage, an 
unborn human being has the same moral status as a newborn infant. 
                                                                                                                     
informed by public medical professionals, in the twenty-first week of her pregnancy, that fetus had 
congenital defects and would die in utero or shortly after birth.” Id. at 231. See also Sarah E. Levin, I 
Shouldn’t Be Forced to Give Birth to a Baby Who Won’t Live, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/opinion/abortion-hyde-amendment.html?searchResultPosition=1 
(explaining how federal health insurance refused to cover an abortion). 
113 See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
114 See Marc Santora & Joanna Berendt, Polish Women Protest Proposed Abortion Ban (Again), 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/world/europe/poland-abortion-
women-protest.html?searchResultPosition=1: 
WARSAW — To Magda, giving birth would have meant inflicting a slow death. 
Her unborn child had a rare genetic syndrome that causes severe, fatal birth defects. 
“I would feed it, hug it, love it, get attached to it, and then, when it would be 3 or 4 
months old, it would suffocate while in my arms,” she recalled, explaining her 
decision a decade ago to have an abortion. “It would scar me for life. I don’t know if 
I would be capable of giving birth to another child and not look at it as if it were the 
one that had died in my arms.” 
She asked that her surname not be used, fearing that the agonizing decision she 
made could be used to shame her. But even in Poland, an overwhelmingly Roman 
Catholic country with some of the strictest anti-abortion laws in Europe and a 
government seeking to curb reproductive rights, it is a decision she could still make 
legally — at least for now. 
Lawmakers from the governing Law and Justice party, who have previously tried to 
ban all abortions, are making a renewed push to outlaw them, even when the fetus is 
sure to die in infancy. 
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The Georgia statute at issue in Doe v. Bolton115 was more permissive 
than the Texas statute. The statute exempted abortions if “(1) a 
continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the pregnant 
woman or would seriously and permanently injure her health; or (2) the 
fetus would very likely be born with a grave, permanent, and irremediable 
mental or physical defect; or (3) the pregnancy resulted from forcible or 
statutory rape.”116 For some, the conclusion that the Texas statute was 
based on sex-selective sympathy and indifference is too speculative and 
contentious to have warranted a ruling against the statute. Although I 
disagree, I concur that the conclusion that the Georgia statute—which, 
again, was more permissive than the Texas statute—was based on 
sex-selective sympathy and indifference is too speculative to have 
warranted a ruling against the statute. It bears mention, in that regard, that 
the Georgia statute was a reform measure, patterned, as the Court 
explained in Doe v. Bolton: 
upon the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 
§ 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) . . . The ALI 
proposal has served [as of 1973] as the model for recent 
legislation in approximately one-fourth of our States. The 
new Georgia provisions replaced statutory law that had been 
in effect for more than 90 years. . . . The predecessor statute 
paralleled the Texas legislation considered in Roe v. Wade . . 
. and made all abortions criminal except those necessary “to 
preserve the life” of the pregnant woman.117 
The conclusion (or assumption) that the Georgia statute was not based 
on sex-selective sympathy and indifference and so did not violate the right 
to equal protection leaves open the question whether the statute violated 
any other constitutional right. The statute obviously implicated the right of 
privacy: “the right . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child.”118 However, that the Georgia statute implicated the 
right of privacy does not entail that it violated the right; a law (or other 
policy) violates the right if, and only if, the law is not necessary to serve a 
very weighty (“compelling”) government objective. 
That the Georgia statute served such an objective is clear: Protecting 
human life is a paramount government objective, and that the life being 
protected is unborn does not ipso facto render the government objective 
less weighty. It is noteworthy that U.S. law makes it a crime to injure or 
                                                                                                                     
115 410 U.S. 179, 181 (1973).  
116 1968 Ga. Laws 1277–78. 
117 410 U.S. at 182–83 (citations omitted). 
118 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
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kill a “child in utero”—defined as “a member of the species Homo sapiens, 
at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb”—while 
committing one or more of over sixty different federal crimes.119 
No government objective is legitimate, much less compelling, under 
the right of privacy, as I explained earlier in this Article, if government’s 
pursuit of the objective is based on—in the sense that government would 
not be pursuing the objective but for—a sectarian moral belief. 
Government’s pursuit of the objective of protecting unborn human life is 
based partly on the premise that human life is worthy of protection, and 
partly on the premise that unborn human life is human life. Although the 
former premise is a moral premise, it is not at all sectarian; the latter 
premise is not a moral premise, nor is it sectarian: That unborn human life 
is human life—that an unborn human being is a member of the human 
species, not of some other species—is an uncontested biological fact. Even 
though “many describe the status of the embryo imprecisely by asking 
when human life begins or whether the embryo is a human being. No one 
seriously denies that the human zygote is a human life. The zygote is not 
dead. It is also not simian, porcine, or canine.”120 Philosopher Peter Singer, 
who is famously pro-choice, has acknowledged that “the early embryo is a 
‘human life.’ Embryos formed from the sperm and eggs of human beings 
are certainly human, no matter how early in their development they may 
be. They are of the species Homo sapiens, and not of any other species. We 
can tell when they are alive, and when they have died. So long as they are 
alive, they are human life.”121  Similarly, constitutional scholar Laurence 
Tribe, a staunch pro-choice advocate, has written that “the fetus is alive. It 
belongs to the human species.  It elicits sympathy and even love, in part 
because it is so dependent and helpless.”122 It is beyond serious debate that 
unborn human life is human life. 
Moreover, that the Georgia statute was necessary to serve the weighty 
objective it was designed to serve is also clear: Just as there is no reason to 
doubt that there are fewer infanticides in consequence of a criminal ban on 
infanticide than there would be if there were no such ban, there is no 
reason to doubt that there are fewer abortions under a criminal ban on 
                                                                                                                     
119 The law is codified in two sections of the United States Code. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012) 
(outlining the protection of unborn children); 10 U.S.C. § 919(a) (2012) (outlining death or injury of an 
unborn child). 
120 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Moral Knowledge: Some Reflections on Moral Controversies, 
Incompatible Moral Epistemologies, and the Culture Wars, 10 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 79, 84 (2004). 
121 PETER SINGER, THE PRESIDENT OF GOOD AND EVIL:  THE ETHICS OF GEORGE W. BUSH 37 
(Open Road Media ed. 2004). 
122 Laurence H. Tribe, Will the Abortion Fight Ever End: A Nation Held Hostage, N.Y.  TIMES 
(July 2, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/02/opinion/will-the-abortion-fight-ever-end-a-
nation-held-hostage.html. 
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abortion—indeed, significantly fewer—than there would be if there were 
no such ban. 
But even if the Georgia statute was necessary to serve a very weighty 
government objective, there remains this concern: A ban on abortion—
even a ban, such as the Georgia statute, of a relatively permissive sort—
imposes a heavy burden on the women who, but for the ban, would choose 
to have an abortion. As the concurrence stated in Roe v. Wade: 
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant 
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. 
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early 
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional 
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and 
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and 
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the 
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted 
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a 
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care 
for it.  In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties 
and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be 
involved.123 
Notwithstanding the heavy burden it imposed on (some) women, many 
conclude that a ban on abortion—at least, a ban, such as Georgia’s, that 
exempted several categories of abortion—is warranted: in particular, those 
who discern no good reason to distinguish, along the dimension of 
importance, among (a) the welfare of newborns and infants, (b) the welfare 
of unborn human beings at a late gestational stage, and (c) the welfare of 
unborn human beings at an early gestational stage. That position is not 
unreasonable. “[N]o stage of nascent development . . . is so significant that 
it points to a major qualitative change: not implantation, not quickening, 
                                                                                                                     
123 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). In his justly famous critique of the Supreme Court’s rulings in the 
Abortion Cases, John Hart Ely wrote that we must “not underestimate what is at stake: Having an 
unwanted child can go a long way toward ruining a woman’s life.” John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying 
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 923 (1973). According to Richard Posner, the 
Court in the Abortion Cases understated the weight of the burden: 
No effort is made to dramatize the hardships to a woman forced to carry her fetus to 
term against her will. The opinion does point out that “maternity, or additional 
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future,” and it elaborates 
on the point for a few more sentences. But there is no mention of the woman who is 
raped, who is poor, or whose fetus is deformed. There is no reference to the death of 
women from illegal abortions. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 337 (First Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1994) (1992). 
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not viability, not birth.”124 By contrast, many others conclude that the 
heavy burden that even the relatively permissive Georgia statute imposed 
on women is too great: In particular, those whose concern for the welfare 
of the women who bear, or would bear, the burden dominates their concern 
for the welfare of unborn human beings at an early gestational stage.  Such 
persons typically believe that there is good reason to distinguish, along the 
dimension of importance, between the welfare of newborns and infants and 
the welfare of unborn human beings at an early gestational stage—for 
example, at the stage prior to the emergence of what philosopher David 
Boonin has called “organized cortical brain activity,” which, Boonin 
explains, emerges no earlier than approximately the twenty-fifth week of 
gestation.125 That position, too, is not unreasonable. 
However, it is not proper business of the Supreme Court to resolve 
disagreements like that described in the preceding paragraph. As Justice 
Souter wrote in his concurring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg, in 
which the Court unanimously rejected a constitutional challenge to a ban 
on physician-assisted suicide: 
[This Court] has no warrant to substitute one reasonable 
resolution of the contending positions for another, but 
authority to supplant the balance already struck between the 
contenders only when it falls outside the realm of the 
reasonable. . . . [We should] respect legislation within the 
zone of reasonableness. . . . It is no justification for judicial 
intervention merely to identify a reasonable resolution of 
contending values that differs from the terms of the 
legislation under review. It is only when the legislation’s 
justifying principle, critically valued, is so far from being 
commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily 
or pointlessly applied that the statute must give way.126 
                                                                                                                     
124 RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, S.J., CORRECTIVE VISION: EXPLORATIONS IN MORAL THEOLOGY 
183 (1994). Cf. Michael J. Wreen, The Standing Is Slippery, 79 PHILOSOPHY 553, 571–72 (2004) 
(emphasis added): 
The Abortion Argument offers an indirect argument for its conclusion, one that 
simply piggybacks on the claim that a given being, a two-year-old, is a human 
being/person/etc. The fundamental grounds for, say, possession of a right to life are 
not mentioned, much less explored, in the argument. What this means is that it’s a 
secondary, indirect argument, one that attempts to carry the day without itself 
tackling any of the weightier issues, both metaphysical and moral, that surround 
humanity, personhood, moral status, and the right to life. It could be that such an 
argument is the best that can be done as far as the issue of fetal status and the 
morality of abortion is concerned. 
125 DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION 115 et seq. (2002).  
126 Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 764–65, 768 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
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Under the right of privacy, the Court has no business striking down—it 
acts too aggressively in striking down—a law or other policy that is 
necessary to serve a weighty government objective just because the Court 
can “identify [and prefers] a reasonable resolution of contending values 
that differs from the terms of the legislation under review.”127 If the law at 
issue is necessary to serve a weighty government objective, it should be 
enough to uphold the law that the lawmakers’ resolution of the contending 




For the foregoing reasons—reasons that presuppose the theory of 
judicial review set forth at the beginning of this Article—I conclude that 
the Texas statute struck down by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, but 
not the Georgia statute struck down in Doe v. Bolton, was 
unconstitutional.129 My conclusion is, of course, controversial: many insist 
that both statutes were unconstitutional; many others insist that neither 
statute was unconstitutional. Although controversial, my conclusion brings 
me into alignment with the position espoused by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg in 1985, when she was a judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.130 
                                                                                                                     
127 PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 35, at 157. 
128 Washington, 521 U.S. at 702, 764–65, 768. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of 
Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 50–51 (1993): 
[T]hink what we might say to some public-spirited citizen who wishes to launch a 
campaign or lobby her [representative] on some issue of rights about which she feels 
strongly and on which she has done her best to arrive at a considered and impartial 
view. She is not asking to be a dictator; she perfectly accepts that her voice should 
have no more power than that of anyone else who is prepared to participate in 
politics. But—like her suffragette forbears—she wants a vote; she wants her voice 
and her activity to count on matters of high political importance. 
[I]magine ourselves saying to her: “You may write to the newspaper and get up a 
petition and organize a pressure group to lobby [the legislature]. But even if you 
succeed, beyond your wildest dreams, and orchestrate the support of a large number 
of like-minded men and women, and manage to prevail in the legislature, your 
measure may be challenged and struck down because your view . . . does not accord 
with the judges’ view. When their votes differ from yours, theirs are the votes that 
will prevail.” It is my submission that saying this does not comport with the respect 
and honour normally accorded to ordinary men and women in the context of a 
theory of rights. 
129 To say that the Texas statute struck down by the Court in Roe v. Wade was unconstitutional is 
not to say that the statute was unconstitutional for the reasons the Court gave; it is not to say that the 
Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade was adequate to its judgment. 
130 See Ginsburg, supra note 102, at 381–82 (stating that the Supreme Court “properly invalidated 
the Texas [law]” in Roe, but that the change encapsulated in the decision went too far); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199 n.83 (1992) (suggesting that if 
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V. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Now, the constitutional controversy concerning same-sex marriage: 
Does excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage—“the exclusion 
policy”—violate the Constitution? In Obergefell v. Hodges a sharply 
divided Supreme Court ruled it does,131 which does not entail that the 
ruling was correct. Nor does the ruling, even if correct, entail that the 
reasoning the Court deployed in support of its ruling was sound. Although 
in my judgment the ruling was correct, my rationale in the following pages 
differs from the rationale on which the Court in Obergefell relied.132 
The inquiry I will pursue here: Does the exclusion policy violate either 
the constitutional right to equal protection or the constitutional right of 
privacy? 
The exclusion policy obviously disadvantages some same-sex 
couples—those who want access to civil marriage—and the more extreme 
the policy, the more severe the disadvantage. The most extreme version of 
the policy: refusing to grant to same-sex couples any of the legal benefits 
that accompany access to civil marriage. A less extreme version: granting 
to same-sex couples some, but not all of the legal benefits that accompany 
access to civil marriage. The least extreme version: granting to same-sex 
couples all of the legal benefits that accompany access to civil marriage, 
but refusing to honor the same-sex union—refusing to dignify it—with the 
title “marriage.”133 However, that the exclusion policy disadvantages 
same-sex couples does not mean that the policy violates the right to equal 
protection. Whether the policy violates the right to equal protection 
depends on whether the policy is based on the demeaning view that 
                                                                                                                     
the Supreme Court had only struck down the extreme Texas law in Roe and left the Georgia law in 
Doe, the rulings may have “reduce[d] rather than . . . fuel[ed] controversy”). 
131 Obergefell v. Hodges, 138 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015) (writing the five-person majority is Justice 
Kennedy, with four Justices filing four dissents). 
132 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, relied at some points on the Equal 
Protection Clause and at other points on “substantive due process” doctrine. Id. at 2602–03. The 
opinion is not the model of clarity. For a collection of alternative Obergefell opinions, some of them 
dissenting, by several legal scholars, see, for example, Jeremy Waldron, What a Dissenting Opinion 
Should Have Said in Obergefell v. Hodges 1, 16 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law: Public Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16–44, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2844811 (concluding that it is not the “proper role of the federal judiciary to 
effect such a change”); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, (Concurring), in WHAT OBERGEFELL V. 
HODGES SHOULD HAVE SAID 112 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2020) (writing separately to emphasize the 
broad protections under the Due Process Clause for same-sex couples who similarly “have liberty 
interests in family formation and recognition [like] different-sex couples”). 
133 Refusing to honor the same-sex union—refusing to dignify it—with the title “marriage” does 
disadvantage same-sex couples. See Mathew S. Nosanchuk, Response: No Substitutions, Please, 100 
GEO. L.J. 1989, 2004–13 (2012) (discussing that there are no substitutes for recognition of marriage 
because of the rights that marriage confers and the symbolic importance of marriage); Douglas 
NeJaime, Framing (In)Equality for Same-Sex Couples, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 184, 199 (2013) 
(noting that LGBT rights advocates seek marriage as the “only true mark of equality”). 
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LGBTQ+ persons are morally inferior human beings.134 Is the policy based 
on that view? Government action is based on a view if, but for the view, 
the government would not be doing what it is doing. Is the demeaning view 
that LGBTQ+ persons are morally inferior a “but for” predicate of the 
exclusion policy? 
The view that LGBTQ+ persons are morally inferior is sadly familiar. 
Judge Richard Posner, writing about the “irrational fear and loathing of” 
LGBTQ+ persons, has observed that they, like the Jews with whom they 
“were frequently bracketed in medieval persecutions[,] . . . are despised 
more for what they are than for what they do . . . .”135 The Connecticut 
Supreme Court has echoed that observation, noting that LGBTQ+ persons 
are often “‘ridiculed, ostracized, despised, demonized and condemned’ 
merely for being who they are . . . .”136 Legal scholar Andrew Koppelman 
has rehearsed some grim examples, including “the judge’s famous speech 
at Oscar Wilde’s sentencing for sodomy, one of the most prominent legal 
texts in the history of homosexuality, [which] ‘treats the prisoners as 
objects of disgust, vile contaminants who are not really people, and who 
therefore need not be addressed as if they were people.’”137 Koppelman 
continues:  
From this it is not very far to Heinrich Himmler’s speech to 
his SS generals, in which he explained that the medieval 
German practice of drowning gay men in bogs “was no 
punishment, merely the extermination of an abnormal life. It 
had to be removed just as we [now] pull up stinging nettles, 
toss them on a heap, and burn them.”138 
                                                                                                                     
134 See Obergefell, 138 S. Ct. at 2604 (discussing that unequal policy “serves to disrespect and 
subordinate [same-sex couples]”). 
135 POSNER, supra note 123, at 346. As history teaches, the “irrational fear and loathing” of any 
group often has tragic consequences. The irrational fear and loathing of gays and lesbians is no 
exception. There is, for example, the horrible phenomenon of “gay bashing.” ANDREW KOPPELMAN, 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 164 (1996).  
The coordinator of one hospital’s victim assistance program reported that “attacks 
against gay men were the most heinous and brutal I encountered.” A physician 
reported that injuries suffered by the victims of homophobic violence he had treated 
were so “vicious” as to make clear that “the intent is to kill and maim” . . . . 
Id. at 165 (citations omitted). As “[a] federal task force on youth suicide noted[,] because ‘gay youth 
face a hostile and condemning environment, verbal and physical abuse, and rejection and isolation from 
family and peers,’ young gays are two to three times more likely than other young people to attempt 
and to commit suicide.” Id. at 149. 
136 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 446 (Conn. 2008) (quoting Snetsinger v. 
Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 454 (Mont. 2004) (Nelson, J., concurring)).  
137 Andrew Koppelman, Are the Boy Scouts Being as Bad as Racists?: Judging the Scouts’ 
Antigay Policy, 18 PUB. AFF. Q. 363, 372 (2004). 
138 Id. (citation omitted). 
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So we should not discount the possibility that some laws and policies 
that disadvantage LGBTQ+ persons do indeed violate the right to equal 
protection. Until 2010, an ugly example remained on the books in Florida: 
“No person eligible to adopt under [the Florida Adoption Act] may adopt if 
that person is a homosexual.”139 Under the Florida law, which is fairly 
described as homophobic, ex-felons of all sorts may adopt a child; even a 
convicted child abuser may adopt a child.140 But until 2010, no 
“homosexual” could do so.141 The Florida judiciary was right to rule that 
the statute violated the right that “[u]nder the Florida Constitution, each 
individual person has . . . equal protection of the laws.”142 
But that some laws and policies that disadvantage LGBTQ+ persons 
violate the right to equal protection does not mean that every law and 
policy that disadvantages LGBTQ+ persons violates the right to equal 
protection. And, as it happens, it is questionable whether in the 
contemporary United States, the view that LGBTQ+ persons are morally 
inferior is a “but for” predicate of the exclusion policy. “In the United 
States, this is, for many and perhaps most who support the exclusion 
policy, the dominant and sufficient rationale for the policy: [Same-sex 
sexual conduct is immoral.] Admitting same-sex couples to civil marriage 
would . . . legitimize—‘normalize’—and thereby incentivize [immoral] 
conduct. This we must not do . . . .”143 However, the claim that same-sex 
sexual conduct is immoral does not assert, imply, or presuppose that those 
who engage in the conduct are morally inferior human beings, any more 
than the claim that, say, theft is immoral asserts, implies, or presupposes 
that those who steal are morally inferior human beings. By contrast, “the 
very point” of laws that criminalized interracial marriage was “to signify 
and maintain the false and pernicious belief that nonwhites are morally 
inferior to whites.”144 
                                                                                                                     
139 FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Regular Sess.). However, this law 
was declared unconstitutional by Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals because it had “no rational 
basis.” Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So.3d 79, 91 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010). Florida stopped enforcing the adoption ban in 2010, but the state legislature did not 
repeal the law until 2015. Bill Cotterell, Governor Signs Law Repealing Gay Adoption Ban, 
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (June 11, 2015, 7:00 PM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/ 
politics/2015/06/11/governor-signs-law-repealing-gay-adoption-ban/71092762/; John Schwartz, 
Florida Court Calls Ban on Gay Adoptions Unlawful, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/us/23adopt.html (noting that the Florida law was thirty years 
old). 
140 See FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (West 2003) (excluding only “homosexual[s]” and persons with a 
physical disability or handicap from adopting).  
141 Id. 
142 Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So.3d at 83.  
143 Michael J. Perry, Obergefell v. Hodges: An Imagined Opinion, Concurring in the Judgment 6 
(Emory Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-356, 2015), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2624022. 
144 John Corvino, Homosexuality and the PIB Argument, 115 ETHICS 501, 509 (2005). 
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This is not to deny that some “of the antigay animus that exists in the 
United States is just like racism, in the virulence of the rage it bespeaks 
and the hatred that it directs towards those who are its objects.”145 Again, 
some laws and policies that disadvantage LGBTQ+ persons violate the 
right to equal protection. But “[n]ot all antigay views . . . deny the 
personhood and equal citizenship of gay people.”146 As legal scholar 
Robert Nagel has emphasized, “[t]here is the obvious but important 
possibility that one can ‘hate’ an individual’s behavior without hating the 
individual.”147 The pope and bishops of the Catholic Church insist that 
same-sex sexual conduct is immoral and are prominent—indeed, leading—
opponents of “legislative and judicial attempts, both at state and federal 
levels, to grant same-sex unions the equivalent status and rights of 
marriage—by naming them marriage, civil unions or by other means.”148 
Nonetheless, the pope and bishops also insist that all human beings, 
LGBTQ+ persons no less than others, are equally beloved children of God: 
“[Our teaching] about the dignity of homosexual persons is clear. They 
must be accepted with respect, compassion, and sensitivity. Our respect for 
them means we condemn all forms of unjust discrimination, harassment or 
abuse.”149 
                                                                                                                     
145 Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay 
People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 145 (2006). 
146 Id. 
147 Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense in Colorado, FIRST THINGS 34, 35 (May 1998), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/1998/05/004-playing-defense-in-colorado. 
148 U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Administrative Committee Calls for Protection of Marriage, U.S. 
CONF. CATH. BISHOPS (Sept. 10, 2003), http://www.usccb.org/news/2003/03-179.cfm. 
149 Id. See also Helen M. Alvaré, A “Bare . . . Purpose to Harm”? Marriage and Catholic 
Conscience Post-Windsor 27–28 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
14-14, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2433741 (“[A]uthoritative Catholic sources repeat the 
imperative to respect homosexual persons and to condemn unjust discrimination.”). Cf. William N. 
Eskridge Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief, and Conduct to Resist 
Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 697, 704 (2011) (footnotes omitted): 
The Vatican’s 1975 Declaration Persona Humana announced that “homosexual 
acts” are “disordered,” but also acknowledged the modern distinction between 
sexual orientation and sexual acts. The next year, the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops responded with a more gay-tolerant document, “To Live in Christ 
Jesus,” which said this: “Homosexuals, like everyone else, should not suffer from 
prejudice against their basic human rights. They have a right to respect, friendship 
and justice. They should have an active role in the Christian community.” Different 
dioceses adopted slightly different readings of these documents. For example, the 
Church in the state of Washington interpreted the pronouncements to support the 
conclusion that “prejudice against homosexuals is a greater infringement of the 
norm of Christian morality than is homosexual orientation or activity.” . . . 
[R]eflecting a strong turn in public opinion toward toleration for gay people, the 
American Catholic Church was subtly readjusting its doctrinal stance toward 
homosexuality. According to the Vatican, men and women with homosexual 
tendencies “must be accepted with respect, compassion, and sensitivity. Every sign 
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Predictably, many will be quick to claim that government may not 
adjudge—that it is no part of government’s legitimate business to 
adjudge—same-sex sexual conduct to be immoral. However, if it is true 
that government may not adjudge same-sex sexual conduct to be immoral, 
it is not because government’s doing so violates the right to equal 
protection. Again, adjudging same-sex sexual conduct to be immoral does 
not assert, imply, or presuppose that those who engage in the conduct are 
morally inferior human beings. Therefore, if government may not exclude 
same-sex couples from civil marriage, or otherwise disadvantage LGBTQ+ 
persons, based on the premise that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral, it 
is because government’s doing so violates a constitutional norm other than 
the right to equal protection. 
Let’s consider, in that regard, the constitutional right of privacy, 
which, as I explained earlier in this Article, protects certain fundamental 
aspects of moral freedom: the freedom to live one’s life in accord with 
one’s moral convictions and commitments. A core aspect of the moral 
freedom covered by the right of privacy is the freedom to live one’s life in 
an intimate association with another person—an intimate association, that 
is, of the sort many150 regard as marital. As the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court emphasized in 2003, “the decision whether and whom to marry is 
among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”151 
A clarification of the scope of the right of privacy—a clarification by 
way of analogy—is useful here: 
• The religious freedom that is constitutionally protected 
(the right to the free exercise of religion) obviously 
entails freedom from government action punishing one 
for making a particular choice in exercising one’s 
religious freedom. But it also includes freedom from 
government action discriminating against one for making 
                                                                                                                     
of unjust discrimination in their regard should be avoided.” After fighting the 
antidiscrimination law in Massachusetts through the 1980s, Catholic dioceses 
acquiesced in similar laws adopted by Catholic Connecticut in 1991 and Catholic 
Rhode Island in 1995. Archbishop John Francis Whealon of Hartford, Connecticut 
said this in 1991: “The Church clearly teaches that homosexual men and women 
should not suffer prejudice on the basis of their sexual orientation. Such 
discrimination is contrary to the Gospel of Jesus Christ and is always morally 
wrong.” Many Connecticut legislators took the Archbishop’s statement as tacit 
approval of the antidiscrimination measure (adorned with religious liberty-protective 
exemptions). The Roman Catholic shift in emphasis—not necessarily a shift in 
precise doctrine—was representative of organized religion in America, as public 
opinion shifted strongly toward toleration of gay Americans and same-sex couples. 
150 But, of course, not all. See, e.g., SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE, 
WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE 17–21 (2012) (refuting the revisionist view that 
marriage is distinguished by emotional union and activities that foster it). 
151 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003).   
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a particular choice in exercising one’s religious 
freedom—in particular, by withholding from one benefits 
that are bestowed on others who make a different choice 
in exercising their religious freedom. 
• Similarly, the political freedom that is constitutionally 
protected (e.g., the right to the freedom of speech) 
includes not only freedom from government action 
punishing one for making a particular choice in 
exercising one’s political freedom, but also freedom from 
government action withholding benefits bestowed on 
others who make a different choice in exercising their 
political freedom. 
• As with constitutionally protected religious freedom and 
constitutionally protected political freedom, so too with 
constitutionally protected moral freedom: it includes not 
only freedom from government action punishing one for 
making a particular choice in exercising one’s moral 
freedom, but also freedom from government action 
withholding benefits bestowed on others who make a 
different choice in exercising their moral freedom. 
So, by withholding benefits from a same-sex couple who choose to 
live their lives in an intimate association (of the sort many regard as 
marital) with one another while bestowing benefits on a heterosexual 
couple who choose to live their lives in an intimate association with one 
another, the exclusion policy implicates the right of privacy.  
However, that the exclusion policy implicates the right of privacy does 
not entail that the policy violates the right. Like the right to religious 
freedom and the right to political freedom, the right of privacy is not 
unconditional (absolute), but conditional. A policy that implicates the right 
does not violate the right if the policy satisfies this condition. The policy 
serves a weighty government objective and there is no other way to serve 
the objective, or to serve it nearly as well. Does the exclusion policy satisfy 
that condition? 
The government objectives that have been asserted in defense of the 
exclusion policy are of two sorts: morality-based and non-morality-based. 
By “non-morality-based” objectives, I mean objectives whose pursuit by 
government does not presuppose that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral. 
As I noted earlier, the dominant defense of the exclusion policy, in the 
United States and elsewhere, involves a morality-based government 
objective: “[Same-sex sexual conduct is immoral.] Admitting same-sex 
couples to civil marriage would . . . legitimize—‘normalize’— and thereby 
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incentivize [immoral] conduct. This we must not do . . .”152 For example, in 
2003, the Vatican—specifically, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, whose Prefect at the time, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, later became 
Pope Benedict XVI—argued that admitting same-sex couples to civil 
marriage would signal “the approval of deviant behaviour, with the 
consequence of making it a model in present-day society.”153 
Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage obviously serves the 
government objective of not taking a step that would legitimize conduct 
that many believe to be immoral: same-sex sexual conduct. The serious 
question is whether that government objective—that morality-based 
government objective—qualifies as a legitimate government objective, 
much less a weighty one, under the right of privacy. The answer depends 
on the reason or reasons lawmakers have for believing that same-sex 
sexual conduct is immoral. If the only reason lawmakers have is a religious 
reason—for example, and in the words of one evangelical minister, 
same-sex sexual conduct is “in direct opposition to God’s truth as He has 
revealed it in the Scriptures”154—then the government objective is clearly 
                                                                                                                     
152 Perry, supra note 143, at 6. In his letter to the Congress, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder 
stated: “[T]he legislative record underlying DOMA’s passage contains . . . numerous expressions 
reflecting moral disapproval of gays and lesbians and their intimate and family relationships . . . .” 
Press Release, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Letter from the Attorney General to 
Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-
act. In a footnote attached to that sentence—note vii—the Letter states: 
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. at 15–16 (judgment [opposing same-sex marriage] entails both 
moral disapproval of homosexuality and a moral conviction that heterosexuality 
better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality”); id. at 16 
(same-sex marriage “legitimates a public union, a legal status that most people . . . 
feel ought to be illegitimate” and “put[s] a stamp of approval . . . on a union that 
many people . . . think is immoral”); id. at 15 (“Civil laws that permit only 
heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a collective moral judgment about human 
sexuality”); id. (reasons behind heterosexual marriage—procreation and 
child-rearing—are “in accord with nature and hence have a moral component”); id. 
at 31 (favorably citing the holding [of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)] that an “anti-sodomy law served the rational 
purpose of expressing the presumed belief . . . that homosexual sodomy is immoral 
and unacceptable”); id. at 17 n.56 (favorably citing statement in dissenting opinion 
in Romer [v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)] that “[t]his Court has no business . . . 
pronouncing that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil”). 
Id. (first through third, seventh, ninth, and tenth alterations in original). 
153 Joseph Card. Ratzinger & Angelo Amato, Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal 
Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 
VATICAN (June 3, 2003), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_ 
cfaith_doc_20030731 _homosexual-unions_en.html. 
154 Peter Slevin, 33 Pastors Flout Tax Law with Political Sermons, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2008), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/28/AR2008092802365.html. For 
many Christians, even many evangelical Christians, the belief that same-sex sexual conduct is contrary 
to the will of God is no longer credible. See, e.g., DAVID A. MYERS & LETHA DAWSON SCANZONI, 
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not legitimate. Although government’s acting to protect public morals is 
undeniably a legitimate government objective, government’s acting to 
protect sectarian morals, as I explained earlier, is not a legitimate 
government objective. The right of privacy leaves no room for the 
political-powers-that-be to ban or otherwise impede conduct, such as 
contraception, based on a religious or otherwise sectarian belief that the 
conduct is immoral. 
Of course, a religious reason is not the only reason lawmakers have for 
believing that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral. Indeed, the path of 
reasoning runs in the opposite direction for many religious believers, 
whose position is not that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral because it is 
contrary to the will of God, but that same-sex sexual conduct is contrary to 
the will of God because it is immoral.155 
Again, the pope and bishops of the Roman Catholic Church—the 
“magisterium” of the Church—are leading opponents of “legislative and 
judicial attempts, both at state and federal levels, to grant same-sex unions 
the equivalent status and rights of marriage—by naming them marriage, 
civil unions or by other means.”156 The magisterium’s reason—its 
rationale—for believing that same-sex sexual conduct is immoral is a 
nonreligious reason: a reason that does not assert, imply, or presuppose 
that God—or any other transcendent reality—exists.157 
According to the magisterium, it is immoral not just for same-sex 
couples but for anyone and everyone—even a man and a woman who are 
married to one another—to engage in (i.e., pursuant to a knowing, 
uncoerced choice to engage in) any sexual conduct that is “inherently 
nonprocreative,” and same-sex sexual conduct—like contracepted 
male-female sexual intercourse, masturbation, and both oral and anal sex—
is inherently nonprocreative.158 Because “[w]hat are called ‘homosexual 
unions’ . . . are inherently non-procreative,” declared the Administrative 
                                                                                                                     
WHAT GOD HAS JOINED TOGETHER: THE CHRISTIAN CASE FOR GAY MARRIAGE (2005) (arguing in 
support of marriage for all—including same-sex couples—while maintaining a traditional defense of 
marriage). 
155 It is not always clear which of two different positions one is espousing when one says that X is 
contrary to the will of God: (1) X is contrary to the will of God and therefore immoral, or (2) X is 
immoral and therefore contrary to the will of God. According to the first position, the reason for 
concluding that X is immoral is theological: “X is contrary to the will of God.” But according to the 
second position, the reason for concluding that X is immoral is unstated and not necessarily theological, 
even though the “therefore” is a theological claim. 
156 U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Administrative Committee Calls for Protection of Marriage, supra note 
148.  
157 See id. (stating that “homosexual unions” cannot be given the status of marriage because “they 
are inherently non-procreative”).  
158 See LESLIE WOODCOCK TENTLER, CATHOLICS AND CONTRACEPTION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 
264 (2004) (“Sexual intercourse, a gift ‘proper and exclusive’ to marriage, was—in the ‘objective 
moral order established by God’—inseparably bound up with the begetting of new life.”).  
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Committee of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, they “cannot be 
given the status of marriage.”159 As Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger stated in 
2003, speaking for the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, because 
they “close the sexual act to the gift of life,” “homosexual acts go against 
the natural moral law.”160 
The pope and bishops’ position that inherently nonprocreative sexual 
conduct is, as such—as inherently nonprocreative—immoral is a 
conspicuously sectarian moral position. It bears emphasis, in that regard, 
that the position is extremely controversial even just among Catholic moral 
theologians,161 not to mention among the larger community of religious 
ethicists. 
In the United States, the exclusion policy, now defunct because of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, was based on—the 
policy almost certainly would not have remained on the books in those 
states where it remained on the books but for—the affirmation by many 
citizens of a religious (e.g., biblical) rationale and/or the bishops’ 
nonreligious rationale for holding fast to the belief that same-sex sexual 
                                                                                                                     
159 U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Administrative Committee Calls for Protection of Marriage, supra note 
148. See also Ratzinger & Amato, supra note 153 (“Homosexual unions are totally lacking in the 
biological and anthropological elements of marriage . . . . Such unions are not able to contribute in a 
proper way to the procreation and survival of the human race.”). 
160 Ratzinger & Amato, supra note 153. See also Hollenbach, supra note 85, at 75 (“The United 
States Catholic Bishops have adopted particularly pointed public advocacy positions on . . . resistance 
to gay marriage and public acceptance of the legitimacy of same sex relationships. The Bishops’ 2007 
statement Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship was a formal instruction by the U.S. hierarchy 
covering the full range of the public dimensions of the Church’s moral concerns. In this document, . . . . 
echoing the affirmation by the Catechism of the Catholic Church that homosexual acts ‘are contrary to 
the natural law’ and that ‘under no circumstances can they be approved,’ the bishops oppose[d] 
‘same-sex unions or other distortions of marriage.’”). 
161 See, e.g., MARGARET A. FARLEY, JUST LOVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS 286, 288 
(2006) (arguing that “absolute prohibition of same-sex relationships” cannot be maintained on the 
“basis of sheer human rationality”); TODD A. SALZMAN & MICHAEL G. LAWLER, SEXUAL ETHICS: A 
THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 180–82 (2012) (“Nothing we have argued . . . proves that all 
homosexual acts are morally right[,] . . . only that the arguments advanced by the Church’s 
Magisterium to sustain the judgment that all homosexual acts are morally wrong are unsound and need 
to be revisited.”); Stephen J. Pope, The Magisterium’s Arguments Against “Same-Sex Marriage”: An 
Ethical Analysis and Critique, 65 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 530, 562–64 (2004) (criticizing the 
magisterium’s stance on same-sex marriage, calling it “flawed”). Moreover, “[a] report by 
Washington-based Public Religion Research Institute found that 74 percent of Catholics favor legal 
recognition for same-sex relationships, either through civil unions (31 percent) or civil marriage (43 
percent). That figure is higher than the 64 percent of all Americans, 67 percent of mainline Protestants, 
48 percent of black Protestants and 40 percent of evangelicals.” Religion News Serv., Catholics 
Supportive of Gay Unions, NAT’L CATH. REP., Apr. 1, 2011, at 16. “What’s more, even among 
Catholics who attend services weekly or more, only about one-third (31%) say there should be no legal 
recognition for a gay couple’s relationship, a view held by just 13% of those who attend once or twice 
per month and 16% of those who attend less often.” Nick Sementelli, New Poll: Nuance on Same-Sex 




2021] TWO CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES 1647 
conduct is immoral. But, again, the right of privacy leaves no room for the 
political-powers-that-be to ban or otherwise impede conduct based on a 
sectarian moral belief. Recall from earlier in this Article what Catholic 
moral theologian John Courtney Murray wrote, in the mid-1960s, in his 
Memo to [Boston’s] Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation: 
[T]he practice [of contraception], undertaken in the interests 
of “responsible parenthood,” has received official sanction by 
many religious groups within the community. It is difficult to 
see how the state can forbid, as contrary to public morality, a 
practice that numerous religious leaders approve as morally 
right. The stand taken by these religious groups may be 
lamentable from the Catholic moral point of view. But it is 
decisive from the point of view of law and 
jurisprudence . . . .162 
We may say about the exclusion policy much the same thing Father 
Murray said to Cardinal Cushing about Massachusetts’s anti-contraception 
policy: 
Same-sex marriage has received official approval by various 
religious groups within the community.163 It is difficult to see 
how the state can refuse to countenance, as contrary to 
public morality, a relationship that numerous religious 
leaders and other morally upright people approve as morally 
good. The stand taken by these religious groups and others 
may be lamentable from the Catholic moral point of view. 
But it is decisive from the point of view of the right to moral 
freedom, articulated in the constitutional law of the United 
States as “the right of privacy.”164 
                                                                                                                     
162 See Murray, supra note 85.  
163 Samuel G. Freedman, Push Within Religions for Gay Marriage Gets Little Attention, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/us/push-within-religions-for-gay-
marriage-gets-little-attention.html. See also Eskridge, Jr., supra note 149, at 707–08 (noting that gay 
marriages are recognized by various religious groups); Laurie Goodstein, Unions That Divide: 
Churches Split Over Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/14/us/gay-marriage-issue-divides-churches.html (“But in the clash 
over homosexuality, the battle lines do not simply pit ministers against secular advocates for gay rights. 
Religion is on both sides in this conflict.”); Maggie Astor, Illinois Clergy Members Support Same-Sex 
Marriage in Letter Signed by 260, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/us/260-in-illinois-clergy-call-for-legal-gay-marriage. html 
(“More than 250 religious leaders in Illinois have signed an open letter in support of same-sex marriage 
. . . .”). Cf. Samuel G. Freedman, How Clergy Helped a Same-Sex Marriage Law Pass, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 15, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/us/16religion.html (noting the efforts of liberal 
Christian and Jewish clergy advocating for the passage of same-sex marriage in New York).  
164 For original quote, see Murray, supra note 85.  
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Is there a non-morality-based government objective—an objective 
whose pursuit by government does not presuppose that same-sex sexual 
conduct is immoral—that fares better, under the right of privacy, than the 
foregoing morality-based government objective? The principal such 
objective that has been asserted in defense of the exclusion policy is this: 
Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage serves to decrease the 
number of future children who will be born and raised in single-parent 
families (where typically the single parent is a mother), which, as a 
general matter, is not the optimal way for children to be raised.165 The idea 
here is that the exclusion policy diminishes the continuing erosion of the 
institution of traditional (i.e., heterosexual) marriage, an institution that 
benefits society in numerous ways, but most importantly by decreasing the 
number of future children who will be born and raised in single-parent 
families.166 
Granting that decreasing the number of future children born and raised 
in single-parent families is not merely a legitimate government objective 
but a sufficiently weighty one,167 under the right of privacy, this 
fundamental problem remains: the absence of evidence—evidence, as 
distinct from speculation about possible future scenarios—to support the 
proposition that there is a cause-effect relationship between excluding 
same-sex couples from civil marriage (cause) and decreasing the number 
of future children who will be born and raised in single-parent families 
(effect).168 And given the absence of any evidence to support that 
proposition, how can we reasonably conclude that the exclusion policy 
serves the non-morality-based objective it is claimed to serve? 
Other non-morality-based objectives that have been asserted in defense 
of the exclusion policy fare no better. Consider, for example, the case, 
Varnum v. Brien, in which the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that Iowa’s 
exclusion policy violated the Iowa Constitution.169 After considering 
several non-morality-based objectives—including “promotion of optimal 
environment to raise children,” “promotion of procreation,” and 
                                                                                                                     
165 For an elaboration (and critique) of the argument, with citations to and quotations from 
prominent writings making the argument, see Andrew Koppelman, Judging the Case Against Same-Sex 
Marriage, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 431, 434–44. For a recent variation on the argument, see Helen M. 
Alvaré, A Children’s Rights Perspective Dissent from Obergefell 1–10 (George Mason Univ. Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. LS 18-06, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3149912. 
166 Id. 
167 See Koppelman, supra note 165, at 437 (referencing “data that shows . . . that single 
motherhood is especially hard on children”).  
168 See id. at 440 (“The causes of these patterns [of increasing single motherhood] are not well 
understood. One survey concludes that the most widely cited papers are ‘those that disprove a popular 
explanation, not those that support one.’” (quoting David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The 
Uneven Spread of Single-Parent Families: What Do We Know? Where Do We Look for Answers?, in 
SOCIAL INEQUALITY 3 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004))).   
169 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009). 
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“promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships”170—the court 
concluded: “We are firmly convinced the exclusion of gay and lesbian 
people from the institution of civil marriage does not substantially further 
any important governmental objective.”171 The court then went on to say: 
Now that we have addressed and rejected each specific 
interest advanced by the County to justify the [exclusion 
policy], we consider the reason for the exclusion of gay and 
lesbian couples from civil marriage left unspoken by the 
County: religious opposition to same-sex marriage. The 
County’s silence reflects, we believe, its understanding [that] 
this reason cannot, under our Iowa Constitution, be used to 
justify a ban on same-sex marriage.172 
Nor can that reason—religiously based moral opposition to same-sex 
marriage—justify the exclusion policy under the constitutional right of 
privacy, as I have explained. 
_________________________ 
 
In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Windsor, in which the 
Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the Defense of Marriage Act’s 
exclusion of same-sex marriages from the federal definition of 
“marriage,”173 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, objected to what 
he perceived in the majority opinion to be an accusation that supporters of 
the statutory provision at issue in the case were prejudiced bigots.174 Justice 
Scalia complained that according to the majority, “only those with hateful 
hearts could have voted ‘aye’ on [the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA)].”175 He goes on to say that the majority treated DOMA’s 
“supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob” and as 
“enem[ies] of human decency.”176 “In the majority’s telling,” lamented 
Scalia, “this story is black-and-white: Hate your neighbor or come along 
with us.” 177 In his dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, Chief 
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, stated: 
Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’s decision is 
the extent to which the majority feels compelled to sully 
those on the other side of the debate. The majority offers a 
cursory assurance that it does not intend to disparage people 
                                                                                                                     
170 See id. at 897–904 (analyzing the proffered governmental objectives). 
171 Id. at 906. 
172 Id. at 904. 
173 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013). 
174 Id. at 795–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
175 Id. at 795.  
176 Id. at 796, 800. 
177 Id. at 802. 
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who, as a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-sex 
marriage. That disclaimer is hard to square with the very next 
sentence, in which the majority explains that “the necessary 
consequence” of laws codifying the traditional definition of 
marriage is to “demea[n] or stigmatiz[e]” same-sex couples. 
The majority reiterates such characterizations over and over. 
By the majority’s account, Americans who did nothing more 
than follow the understanding of marriage that has existed for 
our entire history—in particular, the tens of millions of 
people who voted to reaffirm their States’ enduring definition 
of marriage—have acted to “lock . . . out,” “disparage,” 
“disrespect and subordinate,” and inflict “[d]ignitary 
wounds” upon their gay and lesbian neighbors. These 
apparent assaults on the character of fairminded people will 
have an effect, in society and in court. . . . It is one thing for 
the majority to conclude that the Constitution protects a right 
to same-sex marriage; it is something else to portray 
every-one who does not share the majority’s “better informed 
understanding” as bigoted.178 
Given the foregoing passages, it merits emphasis that the 
right-of-privacy route I have taken to the conclusion that the exclusion 
policy is unconstitutional does not involve claiming, or implying, nor does 
it presuppose, that the exclusion policy is based on homophobic bigotry or 
that supporters of the policy are homophobic bigots.179 Where such a route 
is available—a route that steers clear of what legal scholar Steven Smith 
has called “the jurisprudence of denigration”180—surely it should be 
preferred to a route according to which supporters of the challenged policy 




I have now completed the task I set for myself: to present in a single 
article my reflections on two constitutional rights—two that are among the 
                                                                                                                     
178 Obergefell v. Hodges, 138 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted). 
179 Cf. Linda C. McClain, The Rhetoric of Bigotry and Conscience in Battles Over “Religious 
Liberty v. LGBT Rights”, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON 
GROUND 213, 216 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2019) (“The mere step of 
drawing analogies between past and present forms of discrimination to point out how evolving 
understandings lead to recognition that such treatment lacks justification is not—in itself—a charge of 
bigotry.”). 
180 See generally Steven D. Smith, The Jurisprudence of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675, 
678 (2014) (describing Justice Kennedy’s opinion in United States v. Windsor as a “recent and 
egregious instance” of the “discourse of denigration”). 
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most important rights protected by the constitutional law of the United 
States—and two constitutional controversies—two that are among the most 
divisive of our time. 
 
